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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE END OF WORK
Camilla A. Hrdy*
Abstract
The conventional wisdom is that intellectual property (IP) is good for
jobs. Indeed, according to legislators and the U.S. patent office, IP
“creates jobs.” But this is not quite right. A primary function of IP is to
increase the amount of innovation in the economy. Yet a significant
subset of the innovations protected by IP rights, from self-service kiosks
to self-driving cars, are in fact labor-saving and indeed labor-displacing.
They reduce the amount of paid human labor required to complete a task.
Therefore, to the extent IP is successful at incentivizing innovation, IP
actually contributes to job loss. More precisely, IP contributes to what
this Article terms “technological un/employment”: job loss and job
creation resulting from technological change. Commentators concerned
about the “end of work” have suggested using taxation to slow down the
pace of automation and to provide aid to displaced workers. But this
Article yields another surprising insight: IP law itself could be designed
to effectuate similar goals, either alone or in coordination with the tax
system. For example, rather than taxing businesses that employ robots,
legislators could deny patents on robots or tax IP owners and use the
proceeds to fund social programs or a universal basic income. IP’s
relationship to technological un/employment and the implications for
public policy may seem evident in hindsight. Yet the connection has been
overlooked. Lawyers and academics who study IP must pay more
attention.
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Bair, Barton Beebe, Bruce Boyden, Molly Brody, Brian Choi, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Rebecca
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Lemann, Mark Lemley, Jessica Litman, Glynn Lunney, Michael Madison, Alan Marco, Matiangai
Sirleaf, Mark McKenna, Robert Merges, Ion Meyn, Kali Murray, Tejas Narechania, Peter
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Works-In-Progress Conference, and for insightful comments from students and colleagues at the
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Property (WIPIP) Colloquium at Case Western University School of Law, the NYU School of
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“In [the year 2014], IP-intensive industries directly and
indirectly supported 45.5 million jobs, about 30 percent of
all employment.”1
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 2016
“We are being afflicted with a new disease of which some
readers may not yet have heard the name, but of which they
will hear a great deal in the years to come—namely,
technological unemployment.”2
John Maynard Keynes, Economic Possibilities
for our Grandchildren, 1930
INTRODUCTION
In 1589, William Lee visited Queen Elizabeth I, seeking a patent for
his new stocking frame knitting machine.3 The machine’s major benefit
was that it could reduce the number of hours spent hand-knitting clothing
and other cloth items.4 The Queen refused to grant the patent, observing,
“Thou aimest high, Master Lee. Consider thou what the invention could
do to my poor subjects. It would assuredly bring to them ruin by depriving
them of employment, thus making them beggars.”5 Lee thereafter failed
to obtain a patent in France and again in England, when Elizabeth’s
successor James I also denied Lee’s patent for the same reason:
Mechanization of knitting would put people out of work.6 A patent to
1. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY:
2016 UPDATE ii (2016).
2. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, in ESSAYS IN
PERSUASION 192, 196 (Classic House Books, 2009) (1931).
3. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF
POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 182 (2012).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 182–83.
6. Id.
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operate the technology in the realm would therefore be contrary to the
public interest.7
Move forward in time over four hundred years. The U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office (USPTO) recently issued a report on the impact of
intellectual property (IP) on the economy and the workforce.8 According
to the USPTO report, “IP-intensive industries”9 create more jobs than
other industries, and wages are forty-six percent higher.10 The report’s
conclusions, if true,11 appear to vindicate the views of many
policymakers—that functioning intellectual property laws “create
jobs.”12
Which story is right? Do intellectual property rights “create jobs”? Or
do intellectual property rights “depriv[e] [people] of employment, thus
making them beggars”?13 This Article considers this question and seeks
to bring the broader discussion of intellectual property’s impact on human
work into the field.14 The Article’s main insight is as follows: Intellectual
property may be partly responsible for job creation for people who work
7. Id.
8. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at 1.
9. The USPTO report defines IP-intensive industries as industries that rely more heavily
on intellectual property than others. The report measures patents, trademarks, and copyrights, but
not trade secrets. See id. Empirical studies on trade secrets are relatively rare for various reasons.
See Michael Risch, Empirical Methods in Trade Secret Research, in II RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter S. Mennell & David L. Schwartz eds.,
forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1, 5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2658685 [https://perma.cc/6AK3-7RQQ].
10. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at 1; see also Stuart J.H. Graham et
al., Business Dynamics of Innovating Firms: Linking U.S. Patents with Administrative Data on
Workers and Firms, 27 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 372, 373 (2018) (“We find patenting firms,
particularly young patenting firms, disproportionally contribute jobs to the U.S. economy.”).
11. The USPTO report’s conclusions and methodology have been critiqued by several
commentators. See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65,
121 (2015); see also Camilla A. Hrdy, Intellectual Property and Jobs, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
(Mar. 5, 2018), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2018/03/intellectual-property-andjobs.html [https://perma.cc/A8BU-CMGT] (discussing the ways in which the report was flawed).
12. In a representative quote, Senator Leahy stated to his colleagues that by strengthening
the patent system, the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA) would “create jobs,
improve products, and reduce costs for American companies and American consumers.” See
Patrick Leahy, Leahy: Now is the Time to Act on Patent Reform, PATRICK LEAHY (Mar. 8, 2011),
https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-now-is-the-time-to-act-on-patent-reform
[https://perma.cc/23U4-ZJ7U].
13. ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 183.
14. The impact of intellectual property on employment is rarely considered in the legal
literature. Professor Mark Lemley recently tackled a related issue: What is the role of intellectual
property in producing artificial scarcity when technology effectively eliminates the cost of
production? Lemley briefly considered the impact of “post-scarcity” technologies like 3D printing
on employment. See Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460,
511 (2015).
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within IP-intensive industries such as motion pictures, software, and
computer systems design.15 But a significant subset of the innovations
protected by intellectual property, from self-service kiosks to self-driving
cars, are labor-saving, and in many cases also labor-displacing. These
innovations drastically reduce the amount of paid human labor required
to complete a task. These innovations, in turn, are partly responsible for
what economists call technological unemployment: job loss resulting
from technological change.16
Autonomous vehicles provide a striking example. Companies like
Alphabet, Uber, Tesla, and General Motors are competing to perfect
“self-driving” vehicles that can drive and navigate without human
drivers.17 These companies rely on intellectual property rights (including
but not limited to patents) in order to achieve the excess rents of a right
to exclude others.18 The result is greater profits for owners of intellectual
property covering self-driving vehicles, and higher wages for the
roboticists and engineers whose skills are necessary to generate this
intellectual property.19 But self-driving vehicles, if widely adopted, could
spell the end of paid employment for taxi drivers, Uber drivers, truck
drivers, and millions of other people whose jobs entail driving for a
living.
Are the intellectual property rights that helped give rise to self-driving
vehicles in some sense responsible for these lost jobs? Are they in some
sense responsible for the unequal division of rewards between, say, Uber,
which owns significant intellectual property relating to self-driving
vehicles,20 and Uber drivers, whose jobs those same inventions will one
day replace? This Article asserts that to the extent intellectual property is
successful at incentivizing innovation, the answer to both questions must
be “yes.” Intellectual property facilitates the process by which technology
replaces certain jobs and increases the returns from doing so.21
Yet this does not mean that intellectual property, or innovation itself,
is bad for jobs. It simply means that intellectual property is not all good
for jobs. When legislators highlight intellectual property’s “job creation”
potential, they must be clearer that intellectual property’s impact on
employment is double-sided. Both sides of this process—what this
15. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at 25–29 (listing the major
industries identified as being “IP-intensive”).
16. See infra notes 33–36.
17. See infra Part II.C.4.
18. Part II.B explains intellectual property’s right-to-exclude mechanism.
19. See infra Part II.C.4.
20. For a complete list of Uber’s patents, see Patents Assigned to Uber Technologies,
Inc., JUSTIA PATS. (2018), http://patents.justia.com/assignee/uber-technologies-inc?page=2
[https://perma.cc/5H5K-FJ6B]. For further discussion of self-driving cars, see Part II.C.4.
21. See infra Parts III.C.1–4.
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Article terms “technological un/employment”—must be considered in
order to understand what is happening in the innovation economy, and in
order to understand intellectual property’s role in this process.
This Article fills a major gap in the literature. Labor and employment
law scholars, as well as tax law scholars, have already begun to address
workers’ uncertain fate in a world of increasing automation, which is
arguably one of the major social crises of the day.22 Intellectual property
scholars, in contrast, have not yet seriously considered the impact of
intellectual property on human work, despite the fact that intellectual
property is the legal regime with the strongest connection to technological
innovation.23 This Article comprehensively covers the topic, and urges
lawyers and academics to pay more attention—especially in light of the
alarming political possibilities revealed herein.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I defines what it means for
innovations to be “labor-displacing” and explains in detail the doublesided impact that labor-displacing innovations have on employment. This
part draws on substantial research by labor economists and economic
historians.24
Part II explains the underappreciated and surprising role of intellectual
property in producing technological un/employment. Since at least the
sixteenth century, rulers like Queen Elizabeth I recognized that exclusive
“privileges” to practice a certain technology within the realm could
adversely impact employment.25 This part shows that, contrary to
conventional wisdom, intellectual property still has this impact today. It
increases the overall amount of labor-displacing innovations available for
use in the economy (called the “Incentive Effect”) and exacerbates the
unequal distribution of rewards between the owners and generators of
intellectual property and the workers whom those inventions replace
(called the “Distribution Effect”).26
22. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and
Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 257 (2018); Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82
U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 101 (2015); see also Ryan Abbott & Bret Bogenschneider, Should
Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age of Automation, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 145, 146–47
(2018) (stating that industry experts are predicting that automation will soon result in substantial
“technological unemployment”).
23. Professor Lemley’s brief analysis is a notable exception. See Lemley, supra note 14.
Several IP scholars have recently drawn attention to the impact of IP on related socioeconomic
trends, such as increasing inequality. For an example of this, see generally Colleen Chien,
Inequality, Innovation, and Patents (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 201803, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3157983 [https://perma.cc/BZ2G-ESYA].
24. See infra Part I. I am especially grateful to Professor James Bessen’s historical research
on the impact of automation on human work. See JAMES BESSEN, LEARNING BY DOING: THE REAL
CONNECTION BETWEEN INNOVATION, WAGES, AND WEALTH 71 (2015).
25. See ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 182–83.
26. See infra Parts II.C.1 & 4.
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Part III asks what, if anything, policymakers should do differently in
light of the connection between intellectual property and technological
un/employment.27 This Part agrees with prior commentators that
distributive justice, if not necessarily efficiency, weighs in favor of some
form of intervention.28 Yet the political possibilities are alarming.
Imagine a future Congress deciding to ban all patents on “self-driving”
inventions, from cars to data analysis software. This Article rejects such
blunt tools,29 instead urging moderation. It provides a framework for
policymakers and concludes that the most promising option may be to
institute a small tax on certain intellectual property rights that cover
labor-displacing inventions. This would both marginally slow down the
pace of automation and permit government to redistribute the proceeds to
displaced workers in the form of cash or social programs, such as skills
training.30
Part IV concludes.
I. TECHNOLOGICAL UN/EMPLOYMENT EXPLAINED
The term technological un/employment refers to two sides of an
economic phenomenon. On one side is technological unemployment: job
loss brought about by technological change.31 Technological
unemployment has a long pedigree32 and has been widely studied in the
fields of economics33 and public policy.34 But all sophisticated thinkers
on this topic recognize that there is another side to the phenomenon,
27. See infra Part III.C.
28. See infra Part III.C; see also, e.g., ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, RACE
AGAINST THE MACHINE: HOW THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IS ACCELERATING INNOVATION, DRIVING
PRODUCTIVITY, AND IRREVERSIBLY TRANSFORMING EMPLOYMENT AND THE ECONOMY 36–47
(2011) (discussing the various “winners” and “losers” of the new machine age).
29. See infra Part III.C.
30. For a similar conclusion about the need for intervention from the employment law
perspective, see Estlund, supra note 22, at 301–21.
31. See Joel Mokyr et al., The History of Technological Anxiety and the Future of Economic
Growth: Is This Time Different?, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 31, 32 (2015); see also MARTIN FORD, RISE
OF THE ROBOTS: TECHNOLOGY AND THE THREAT OF A JOBLESS FUTURE 29–34 (2015) (discussing
concerns over job loss as a result of technology in the 1960s and ’70s); JEREMY RIFKIN, THE END
OF WORK: THE DECLINE OF THE GLOBAL LABOR FORCE AND THE DAWN OF THE POST-MARKET ERA
81–89 (1995) (discussing concerns over automaton in the 1960s and ’70s).
32. See generally Mokyr et al., supra note 31, at 33–42 (highlighting the concern that
technology would replace jobs since the Industrial Revolution).
33. See, e.g., Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How
Susceptible Are Jobs To Computerisation?, 114 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254, 255
(2016) (discussing a long line of economics research on technology’s impact on jobs).
34. See generally, e.g., DARRELL M. WEST, CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS,
WHAT HAPPENS IF ROBOTS TAKE JOBS? THE EMERGING IMPACT OF ROBOTS ON EMPLOYMENT AND
PUBLIC POLICY (2015) (discussing public policy of technology and unemployment).
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which this Article calls technological employment.35 Technological
employment refers to job creation brought about by technological
change—the process by which new technologies, through a variety of
mechanisms, generate new jobs for humans, even as they take away the
old.36 Technological un/employment is a term of art used throughout this
Article to encapsulate both of these phenomena.
To get a simple preview of how technological un/employment works,
do a Google search for the phrase “self-driving car jobs.” This will likely
provide results for job postings in the field of self-driving car
technology37 and articles with titles like “Who's hiring for self-driving car
jobs.”38 Then do a Google search for the phrase “self-driving car kill
jobs.” This should provide a host of articles about the negative impact of
autonomous vehicles on employment and ideas for how to save the jobs
of human drivers.39
How is it that a single technology can have such a disparate impact on
social welfare, leading to new jobs for some and job losses for others?
This Part explains precisely how both sides of this process work. After
reading this Part, the reader should understand precisely what is meant
by the term “technological un/employment” in Part II, which explains
intellectual property’s role in this process.
A. Labor-Displacing Innovations
Innovation is the driving force behind technological un/employment.
Innovation means a new idea or application of a new idea that generates
35. The phenomenon of “technological employment” is implicitly recognized in the vast
literature on technological unemployment. See, e.g., David H. Autor, Why Are There Still So Many
Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4–5 (2015)
(discussing a variety of reasons why there are still jobs despite increasing improvements in
automation); see also Lewis M. Andrews, Robots Don’t Mean the End of Human Labor, WALL
STREET J. (Aug. 23, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robots-dont-mean-the-end-of-humanlabor-1440367275 [https://perma.cc/4M3N-7E43] (“The invention of, say, the internalcombustion engine put buggy-whip makers and carriage assemblers out of business, but it created
many more jobs in the manufacture, advertising, sales and maintenance of automobiles.”).
36. See discussion infra Part I.B.
37. Google Self Driving Car Project Jobs, INDEED, https://www.indeed.com/q-GoogleSelf-Driving-Car-Project-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/R53Q-K4QF].
38. Marco della Cava, Who’s Hiring for Self-Driving Car Jobs, USA TODAY (Oct. 17,
2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/10/17/google-ford-not-only-names-selfdriving-car-jobs/92315206/ [https://perma.cc/CF2F-HXBV].
39. See, e.g., Mark Fahey, Driverless Cars Will Kill the Most Jobs in Select US States,
CNBC (Sept. 2, 2016) https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/02/driverless-cars-will-kill-the-most-jobsin-select-us-states.html [https://perma.cc/YA5H-PGHZ]; Jack Stewart, Robot & Us: Self-Driving
Trucks Are Coming to Save Lives and Kill Jobs, WIRED (May 5, 2017), https://www.wired.com/
2017/05/robot-us-self-driving-trucks-coming-save-lives-kill-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/KE9A-9NL4].
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value. Value is usually measured in the form of higher profits.40 These
higher profits can be realized in one of two ways: either by generating
some output (a new product or service) for which consumers are willing
to pay, or by generating a new way to increase productivity within a
business (that is, lower cost per output).41 The first type of innovation is
called a product innovation.42 Birth control, the television, and optical
lenses are examples of product innovations.43 The second type is called a
process innovation.44 Using a printing press rather than human scribes
and using robotic arms rather than human employees to manufacture
furniture are both examples of process innovations. Process innovations
drastically lower the cost of producing a certain output (writings and
furniture, respectively) because they require less time, money, and human
labor.45
1. Labor-Displacing Versus Labor-Saving Innovations
Not all innovations reduce the need for human labor. Innovations can
possess advantages that have nothing to do with labor reduction. An
important subset of innovations are labor-saving. Their primary purpose
is to reduce the human labor required to complete a task.46 Anesthesia,
40. As in prior work, this Article relies on economists’ broader definition of innovation,
rather than patent law’s narrower concept of a patentable invention. See Camilla A. Hrdy, Patent
Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1310–11 (2016); see also infra note
42 (defining product innovation).
41. See Hrdy, supra note 40.
42. A product innovation means the introduction of a new product or service, or a
significant improvement on an existing product or service, for which consumers are willing to
pay. CHRISTINE GREENHALGH & MARK ROGERS, INNOVATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 4 (2010).
43. James Fallows, The 50 Greatest Breakthroughs Since the Wheel, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2013)
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/innovations-list/309536/ [https://perma.cc/
P6XN-UWCR].
44. A process innovation means the introduction of a process or method of operation that
increases productivity (reduces the cost per output). GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 9.
Note that a process innovation does not have to be a technique or series of steps. As the Supreme
Court noted in Diamond v. Diehr, a process innovation can be made possible by a “labor-saving
machine” that allows a business to save labor and lower costs. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
182–83 n.7 (1980) (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854)).
45. GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 5, 16. Note that a process innovation can be
tied up with a product innovation. For instance, using the printing press to facilitate copying of
writings came hand in hand with a new product: printed books.
46. The Supreme Court has observed the existence and patentability of “labor-saving”
inventions several times. See, e.g., Diamond, 450 U.S. at 182 n.7 (1981) (“[A]nother may invent
a labor-saving machine by which this operation or process . . . may be carried on with much saving
of labor, and expense of fuel . . . .” (quoting Corning, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 268)); see also H.J.
HABAKKUK, AMERICAN AND BRITISH TECHNOLOGY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE SEARCH
FOR LABOUR-SAVING INVENTIONS 6 (1962) (“[I]t was scarcity of labour ‘which laid the foundation
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invented in 1846, allowed doctors to alleviate pain during surgery. Its
purpose was not to reduce the amount of labor it took to perform the
surgery.47 Further, not all labor-saving innovations are labor-displacing.
For instance, a chairlift, invented in 1936, carries skiers up a hill, saving
them from having to climb up the hill on their own.48 Unless skiers were
previously paying other humans to carry them up the hill, the invention
of the chairlift is labor-saving without being labor-displacing. It does not
adversely affect the employment prospects of others. However, if the
labor saved by the innovation would otherwise be performed by a paid
human worker, then the innovation can be classified as labor-displacing.
It causes a significant reduction in the amount of paid human labor
required to complete a task, and thus may lead to significant job
displacement.49
2. The Role of Automation
Many labor-displacing innovations involve a particular type of
technological development: automation.50 Automation, which is
sometimes used interchangeably with “mechanization” or
“computerisation,” refers generally to using machines to accomplish
tasks that are, or otherwise would be, performed by humans.51 The agent
of automation need not be a robot that looks or functions like a human. It
for the future continuous progress of American industry, by obliging manufacturers to take every
opportunity of installing new types of labour-saving machinery.’” (quoting BRITISH ESSAYS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 264 (H. C. Allen & C. P. Hill eds., 1957))).
47. Fallows, supra note 43.
48. Daniel Engber, Who Made That Ski Lift?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014)
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/magazine/who-made-that-ski-lift.html
[https://perma.cc/ZSM4-N79H].
49. For a discussion on how courts and regulators might determine what is “labordisplacing,” see infra Part III.C.1.
50. See James Bessen, How Computer Automation Affects Occupations: Technology, Jobs,
and Skills 7 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 15-49, 2016)
(“Automation is not the only way that technology affects occupations . . . [but] automation might
lead to job losses because it reduces the labor needed to perform tasks.”).
51. See, e.g., id. at 3 (“Automation of an occupation happens when machines take over one
or more tasks, either completely performing those tasks or reducing the human labor time needed
to perform them.”); see also Raja Parasuraman et al., A Model for Types and Levels of Human
Interaction with Automation, 30 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN & CYBERNETICS 286,
287 (2000) (“We . . . define automation as a device or system that accomplishes (partially or fully)
a function that was previously, or conceivably could be, carried out (partially or fully) by a human
operator.”); see also Frey & Osborne, supra note 33, at 254 n.1 (“We refer to computerisation as
job automation by means of computer-controlled equipment.”).
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simply must, in an economic sense, “substitute” for a human in
performing the task.52
Automation is typically motivated by two interrelated factors: the
desire to reduce the amount of human labor required to complete a task
and thus to lower costs, and the desire to achieve performance benefits,
such as superior speed, accuracy, or quality, that may or may not be
within the capacity of human beings.53 For example, Oracle54 is currently
marketing what it calls an “Autonomous” or “Self-Driving” Database.
This is essentially a software program that permits collecting, managing,
and updating a set of information without human involvement.55 As of
this writing, the advertisement is currently running on the front page of
the print edition of The Wall Street Journal.56
The express purpose of the Self-Driving Database is both to
drastically lower the costs of human labor (by half, to be precise), and to
obtain performance benefits such as greater reliability and improved
security.57 This is a labor-displacing, not just a labor-saving, innovation,
because it is performing work that would otherwise be done by paid
human employees. If successful, this innovation will encroach on jobs
that humans would otherwise have.
As discussed in the next Parts, the impact of automation on the human
workforce is a subject of considerable debate. However, several recent
empirical studies purport to find that many types of automation will
negatively impact the jobs and wages of at least some people. Scholars at
the Oxford Martin School at the University of Oxford estimate that forty52. Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J.
1217, 1224 (2017) (“[R]obots, AI agents, and algorithms substitute for human beings, and operate
as special purpose people.”).
53. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., A FUTURE THAT WORKS: AUTOMATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND
PRODUCTIVITY 11 (2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/
Digital%20Disruption/Harnessing%20automation%20for%20a%20future%20that%20works/M
GI-A-future-that-works_Full-report.ashx [https://perma.cc/32E6-EVM2] (“The deployment of
automation technologies [can] bring a range of performance benefits for companies. . . . They
include, but are not limited to, greater throughput, higher quality, improved safety, reduced
variability, a reduction of waste, and higher customer satisfaction.”).
54. Oracle is one of the most profitable software companies in the world, based in Redwood
Shores, California. See generally Oracle Fact Sheet: Create Tomorrow, Today, ORACLE
(Oct. 2018), http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/oracle-fact-sheet-079219.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R9VL-LC9A] (explaining how Oracle has embedded innovative technologies into its cloud).
55. See The World’s #1 Database Is Now the World’s First Self-Driving Database, ORACLE,
https://www.oracle.com/database/autonomous-database/feature.html
[https://perma.cc/RG8573SM] (“Oracle Autonomous Database Cloud offers total automation based on machine learning
and eliminates human labor, human error, and manual tuning.”).
56. See, e.g., Oracle, Advertisement, World’s First “Self-Driving” Database, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 16, 2017, at A1.
57. Id.
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seven percent of U.S. occupations “are potentially automatable over some
unspecified number of years, perhaps a decade or two.”58 The Oxford
Martin study finds that the jobs most likely to be automated include
cashiers, order clerks, tellers, tax preparers, cargo and freight agents,
watch repairers, title examiners, and telemarketers.59 The safest jobs
include (to name a sampling from the top twenty) recreational therapists,
mental health and substance abuse workers, computer systems analysts,
and anthropologists.60
A McKinsey Global Institute report provides a more conservative
assessment, predicting that although few entire occupations will be
replaced in the near future,61 automation will “affect almost all
occupations . . . to a greater or lesser degree.”62 The report concludes,
strikingly, that “as a rule of thumb, about 60 percent of all occupations
have at least 30 percent of activities that are technically automatable.”63
Obviously, “technically automatable” is not the same as “will be
automated.” The report states that a variety of factors go into a business’s
decision to automate a particular task: (1) technical feasibility; (2)
commercial feasibility; (3) supply and cost of human labor alternatives;64
(4) performance and cost benefits associated with using machines; and
(5) regulatory hurdles or social inhibitions.65 Thus, just because a labordisplacing solution is technically possible does not mean businesses will
choose to adopt it. Countervailing considerations, including the
58. Frey & Osborne, supra note 33, at 265; see also CITI GPS, TECHNOLOGY AT WORK V2.0:
THE FUTURE IS NOT WHAT IT USED TO BE 7 (2016) http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/
downloads/reports/Citi_GPS_Technology_Work_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/F62W-FFFZ] (“47% of
US jobs [are] at risk of computerization.”); Sarah Nassauer, Robots Are Replacing Workers Where
You Shop, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robots-are-replacingworkers-where-you-shop-1500456602 [https://perma.cc/Z4LL-YSVN] (discussing results of
Citi/Oxford study).
59. Frey & Osborne, supra note 33, at 278; see also Mark Whitehouse & Dorothy Gambrell,
How Screwed Is Your Job?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 26, 2017, at 50, 52–53
(summarizing Frey and Osborne’s data).
60. Frey & Osborne, supra note 33, at 269.
61. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 53, at 1 (“Given currently demonstrated
technologies, very few occupations—less than 5 percent—are candidates for full automation
today, meaning that every activity constituting these occupations is automated.”).
62. Id. at 32.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 10 (noting that an important factor is “[t]he quality (for instance, skills), quantity,
as well as supply, demand, and costs of human labor as an alternative affect which activities will
be automated”).
65. Id. at 10–12.
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availability of cheap human labor, reluctance to fire people, and concerns
about reputational harm, can sway businesses in the other direction.66
B. Technological Employment
In light of how much automation we see occurring around us, it is
tempting to predict that technology will inevitably spell the “end of
work.”67 Yet even notorious labor-displacing innovations, from the
spinning loom to the computer, did not eliminate all or even most jobs.68
To the contrary, numerous economists have documented that most labordisplacing innovations end up creating more work than they destroy.69
The reason for this is the phenomenon of technological employment. A
review of the economics literature reveals two main mechanisms by
which technological employment is theorized to occur.
1. Job Generation
The first mechanism of technological employment is “job
generation.” Job generation refers to an innovation creating new jobs—
or, to put it more technically, generating new demand for people with
certain skills.70 Pure job generation is like alchemy, creating jobs where
there previously were none. The simplest example is the invention of a
totally new product (say, a more effective means of anesthesia) for which
people are willing to pay. This drives demand for workers with the skills
necessary to make and distribute the product to consumers.71 Job
66. See id. at 10. The farming industry provides a compelling example of this fact. For some
crops, the availability of cheap labor, not technological feasibility, is the major determinant of
whether growers use machines at harvest or people. See, e.g., Binyamin Applebaum, Fewer
Immigrants Mean More Jobs? Not So, Economists Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/us/politics/legal-immigration-jobs-economy.html
[https://perma.cc/AL24-HF8R].
67. See RIFKIN, supra note 31, at 8–9 (predicting the end or near-end of manual labor in
factories within the “next twenty to thirty years”).
68. Autor, supra note 35, at 4 (“Clearly, the past two centuries of automation and
technological progress have not made human labor obsolete . . . .”).
69. See id. (“[T]he employmentǦtoǦpopulation ratio rose during the 20th century even as
women moved from home to market; and although the unemployment rate fluctuates cyclically,
there is no apparent long-run increase.”).
70. “Job” refers to a bundle of tasks performed by people with similar sets of skills. Bessen,
supra note 50, at 9–10 (defining an occupation as a bundle of tasks that can be performed by
people with similar skills and observing that tasks can be transferred from one occupation to
another); see also CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND
TECHNOLOGY 176–79 (2008) (discussing availability of new jobs as a result of inventions that
permitted automation of some types of work like cash registers and tractors).
71. See Vincent Van Roy et al., Unit of Econometrics & Applied Statistics, Joint Research
Centre, Eur. Comm’n, JRC Technical Report: Innovation and Employment in Patenting Firms:
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generation is also thought to have what economist Enrico Moretti calls a
“multiplier effect.”72 When people have jobs, they spend more money
elsewhere in the economy, such as in the services sector—which in turn
drives demand and job generation in businesses like hair salons and
restaurants.73
Things get more complicated when the innovation itself is labordisplacing (say, a robot that administers anesthesia more efficiently than
humans).74 But even here there can still be job generation due to the fact
that innovations tend to create “substitute” jobs to replace those they
eliminate.75 For example, the invention of the tractor reduced the need for
people to manually plow fields, but tractors also generated new demand
for people with the skills necessary to manufacture, maintain, and operate
tractors.76 As explained in the next Part, the job generation argument
becomes more tenuous the better machines become at performing human
tasks without assistance. For instance, Oracle founder Larry Ellison
claims that Oracle’s Automated Database can “automatically provision,
patch, tune and back-up itself, with no human intervention.”77 But in
theory, any new invention creates at least the possibility for new human
tasks.
Empirical Evidence from Europe, Rep. EUR 27377, at 3 (2015) (“[T]here is less debate about the
positive employment effect of product innovations.”).
72. ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS 55–63 (2012) (discussing the
“multiplier effect” associated with technology sector jobs).
73. See, e.g., David Autor & Anna Salomons, Robocalypse Now—Does Productivity
Growth Threaten Employment?, 2017 ECB F. ON CENT. BANKING 45, 50, https://docplayer.net/
56822268-Investment-and-growth-in-advanced-economies.html [https://perma.cc/3LSH-X3HT]
(“These spillovers are sufficiently large that they more than offset employment losses in industries
making rapid productivity gains.”).
74. See, e.g., BESSEN, supra note 24, at 107–09 (discussing anticipated impact of ATM
machines on bank tellers).
75. See, e.g., James Bessen, Don’t Blame Technology for Persistent Unemployment, SLATE
(Sept. 30, 2013, 3:31 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2013/09/technology-isn-t-taking-all-ofour-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/L6YB-765Y] (arguing that even if an innovation reduces jobs in
one industry, it can offset these losses by generating “job growth in different occupations or
industry segments”); Claire Cain Miller, The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It’s
Automation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/upshot/the-longterm-jobs-killer-is-not-china-its-automation.html [https://perma.cc/6PCV-VG6J] (“Over time,
automation has generally had a happy ending: As it has displaced jobs, it has created new ones.”).
76. See Derek Thompson, How the Tractor (Yes, the Tractor) Explains the Middle Class
Crisis, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/howthe-tractor-yes-the-tractor-explains-the-middle-class-crisis/254270/ [https://perma.cc/ET38-DXHS].
77. Rebecca Hill, Oracle Promises ‘Highly Automated’ Security in Self-Driving Database,
REGISTER (Oct. 2, 2017, 3:53 AM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/10/02/oracle_openworld_
2017_larry_ellison_keynote_day_one/ [https://perma.cc/8NHU-4S5Z] (emphasis added).
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2. Demand-Boosting
The second mechanism of technological employment is what this
Article calls “demand-boosting.”78 Demand-boosting predicts that hiring
within a given occupation or industry will increase as a result of laborsaving innovations that increase productivity (that is, permit more output
at lower cost).79 As prices fall, consumption and demand for the products
increase, and demand for workers rises accordingly.80 For example, if
tractors lower the price of food like tomatoes and wheat, this means
consumers will buy more of that food. This increases demand for food
and for any people whose skills are necessary to plant, grow, harvest, and
distribute the food.81
Several commentators cite to demand-boosting in order to overcome
fears that automation threatens the future of human work.82 But does
demand-boosting really work? To test the theory, economist James
Bessen performed a case study of the automated teller machine (ATM).83
One might think ATMs would have eliminated the jobs of bank tellers.84
But Bessen found that, even though the ATM “took over cash handling
tasks” and reduced work for human tellers, “the number of fulltime
equivalent bank tellers has grown since ATMs were widely deployed
during the late 1990s and early 2000s.”85 Bessen’s explanation is that “the
ATM allowed banks to operate branch offices at lower cost,” which
78. GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 268–69. Another term sometimes used is the
“compensation theory.” Van Roy et al., supra note 71, at 2 (“[T]he so-called ‘compensation
theory’. . . puts forward the view that process innovations lead to more efficient production and
thus, assuming competitive markets, increasing demand and hence employment.”).
79. GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 268–69.
80. James Bessen, AI and Jobs: The Role of Demand 3 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law & Econ.,
Research Paper No. 17-46, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3078715
[https://perma.cc/XTB3-XWZY] (“If demand increases sufficiently, employment will grow even
though the labor required per unit of output declines.”).
81. Demand-boosting usually occurs in conjunction with job generation. Demand for a
company’s output rises in response to increasing productivity and falling prices, and new or
substitute jobs then emerge that need to be filled in order to meet that new demand. See the
discussion in Bessen, supra note 50, at 2–3.
82. See, e.g., Michael Jones, Yes, the Robots Will Steal Our Jobs. And That’s Fine. Those
Jobs Will Be Replaced with New Ones, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/02/17/yes-the-robots-will-steal-ourjobs-and-thats-fine/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.68d28e52a89c [https://perma.cc/C2FX-S8R8];
Jerry Kaplan, Don’t Fear the Robots, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2017, 10:17 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/dont-fear-the-robots-1500646623 [https://perma.cc/KS5Y-XPB2].
83. Bessen, supra note 50, at 5.
84. BESSEN, supra note 24, at 105.
85. Bessen, supra note 50, at 5 (“Indeed, since 2000, the number of fulltime equivalent
bank tellers has increased . . . substantially faster than the entire labor force.”).
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lowered the prices of, and increased demand for, banking services.86 This
in turn “prompted [banks] to open many more branches” to meet the new
demand, and led to hiring of bank tellers along with other related
professionals, such as people who were needed to install and fix ATM
machines.87 This demand-boosting effect, Bessen concludes, “offset[] the
erstwhile loss in teller jobs.”88
C. Technological Unemployment
In light of the theories presented in the last Part, why would anyone
worry about technological unemployment? As explained, technological
unemployment is defined as job loss brought about by technological
change.89 But as is clear by now, technological change also creates new
jobs. If economic historians like Bessen and David Autor are right, in the
past, innovation has created more jobs than it has destroyed.90
And yet, some people are worried about technological unemployment.
Respected public commentators, such as former Treasury Secretary
Lawrence Summers,91 have begun to cast doubt on whether what
happened in the past will hold true in the future.92 Based on a
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also BESSEN, supra note 24, at 105–09 (illustrating how the current narrative
that machines replace labor and reduce employment and wages is “too simplistic”).
89. See the definition in Mokyr et al., supra note 31.
90. See, e.g., Autor & Salomons, supra note 73, at 49 (“Over the 35+ years of data explored
here, we find that productivity growth has been employment-augmenting rather than employmentreducing; that is, it has not threatened employment.”).
91. Lawrence H. Summers, Harvard Univ., Keynote Address at Conference: Making Sense
of the Productivity Slowdown: Reflections on the Productivity Slowdown 16–17 (Nov. 16, 2015),
https://piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/papers/transcript-20151116keynote.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BP4J-FBUR]; see also Eduardo Porter, Jobs Threatened by Machines: A Once
‘Stupid’ Concern Gains Respect, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
06/08/business/economy/threatened-by-machines-a-once-stupid-concern-gains-respect.html
[https://perma.cc/5VGX-XGND] (discussing current debates among economists regarding “end
of work”).
92. For just a sampling of recent media articles expressing anxiety about technological
unemployment, see, for example, Robert C. Allen, Lessons from History for the Future of Work,
550 NATURE 321, 321–24 (2017), https://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/1.22825!/menu/main/
topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/550321a.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMV4-D9T2]; Rachel Abrams
& Robert Gebeloff, Another Blow for a Battered Work Force: E-Commerce Causes Retail Jobs
to Dry Up in Old Steel Towns, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2017, at A1; Special Report, The Impact on
Jobs: Automation and Anxiety: Will Smarter Machines Cause Mass Unemployment?, ECONOMIST
(June 25, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21700758-will-smartermachines-cause-mass-unemployment-automation-and-anxiety [https://perma.cc/CL3S-3ZXQ];
Nida Najar, Indian Technology Workers Worry About a Job Threat: Technology, N.Y. TIMES
(June 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/25/business/india-outsourcing-layoffsautomation-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/B247-EFYQ]; see also, e.g.,
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comprehensive review of this literature, this Part identifies five distinct
reasons people like Summers are worried. These are, in a sense, five
distinct attributes of modern technological unemployment that may
differentiate today’s results from what happened in the past.
1. Increasing Quality and Pace of Automation
First, commentators in the fields of economics, public policy, and
journalism opine that machine capabilities are increasingly encroaching
on the whole gamut of human skills.93 For technological employment via
job generation and demand-boosting to work, there must be tasks left for
humans to do. But if machines can do everything, it does not matter how
many new tasks are generated or how much demand rises. Machines, not
humans, would be the workforce of the future.
Robots (machines that resemble humans) are now capable of
performing a range of classic human functions, from driving vehicles,94
to preparing food,95 to milling steel,96 to testing electronic devices.97
BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 28, at 2–9 (discussing this phenomenon); FORD, supra note
31, at xii (“[M]achines themselves are turning into workers, and the line between the capability
of labor and capital is blurring as never before.”).
93. See BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 28, at 9 (“The pace and scale of this
encroachment into human skills is relatively recent and has profound economic implications.”);
ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND
PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 11 (2014) (“[C]omputers, robots, and other
digital technologies are acquiring [ordinary human] skills and abilities at an extraordinary rate.”);
see also ALEC ROSS, THE INDUSTRIES OF THE FUTURE 27 (2016) (“[T]he current moment in the
field of robotics is very much like where the world stood with the Internet 20 years ago.”); Steve
Lohr, A.I. Will Transform the Economy. But How Much, and How Soon?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/technology/ai-will-transform-the-economy-buthow-much-and-how-soon.html [https://perma.cc/5P35-NC8L] (“[AI] can probably do less right
now than you think. But it will eventually do more than you probably think, in more places than
you probably think, and will probably evolve faster than powerful technologies have in the past.”);
WEST, supra note 34, at 2 (discussing technology’s growing capabilities in various fields).
94. See infra Part II.C.4
95. See Melia Robinson, This Robot-Powered Restaurant Could Put Fast Food Workers
out of a Job, BUS. INSIDER (June 30, 2016, 5:17 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
momentum-machines-is-hiring-2016-6 [https://perma.cc/M62V-R6TM].
96. See Thomas Biesheuvel, How Just 14 People Make 500,000 Tons of Steel a Year in
Austria, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 21, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-06-21/how-just-14-people-make-500-000-tons-of-steel-a-year-in-austria
(describing a nearly deserted steel mill except for “three technicians who sit high above the line,
monitoring output on a bank of flatscreens”).
97. See, e.g., Complaint for Violation of Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Breach of Contract,
Interference with Business Expectancy, and Violation of Washington Consumer Act at 1–3, TMobile USA, Inc. v. Huawei Device USA, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 3d 1184 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (No.
2:14-cv-01351) (asserting T-Mobile’s custom-built phone-testing robot, “Tappy,” was part of a
trade secret dispute after workers at Huawei stole Tappy’s mechanical finger).
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Drones—or “unmanned aerial vehicles”98—can perform a wide range of
jobs formerly or still performed by humans: package delivery,99 going to
war,100 crop-dusting,101 disaster aide,102 and insurance claims
inspection.103 The most influential form of automation consists simply of
implementing algorithms on general purpose computers.104 Quantifying
algorithms’ use in the economy is virtually impossible because
algorithms are used in secret, with little transparency as to their function
and capabilities.105 Computer algorithms permit near-total automation of
a variety of tasks, such as internet searching,106 data collection and
analysis,107 stock picking,108 and designing investment strategies.109 One
98. See generally Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things
They Carry, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 57, 57 (2013) (discussing drones and their related privacy
issues).
99. Elizabeth Weise, Amazon Delivered Its First Customer Package by Drone, USA TODAY
(Dec. 14, 2016, 9:37 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/12/14/amazondelivered-its-first-customer-package-drone/95401366/ [https://perma.cc/H8R3-T5EN].
100. But see Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications,
36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1842 (2015) (exploring legal implications of autonomous weapons
systems, including unclear liability). See generally John Yoo, Embracing the Machines:
Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (2017) (describing
modern applications for robotics in warfare).
101. See SPRAYING DRONE, http://sprayingdrone.com [https://perma.cc/NM34-GVYM]
(marketing “Spraying Drone” brand crop dusters).
102. See, e.g., Associated Press, Drones to the Rescue, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/health/drones-by-air.html [https://perma.cc/QY98-UAUG]
(reporting ambulance drones are used to rapidly deliver defibrillators to people in cardiac arrest).
103. Nicole Friedman, That Drone Hovering Over Your Home? It’s the Insurance Inspector,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/that-drone-hovering-overyour-home-its-the-insurance-inspector-1501839002 [https://perma.cc/T73W-4Y73].
104. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 34, at 4.
105. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 6 (2015).
106. Barry Schwartz, How Google Uses Machine Learning in its Search Algorithms, SEARCH
ENGINE LAND (Oct. 18, 2016, 10:40 AM), https://searchengineland.com/google-uses-machinelearning-search-algorithms-261158 [https://perma.cc/VQA6-L9AL] (discussing Google’s use of
search algorithms to improve internet searching, both with and without human assistance).
107. Oracle Autonomous Database: Think Autonomous, ORACLE, https://www.oracle.com/
database/autonomous-database/feature.htmland [https://perma.cc/Q5HR-2W9Q] (explaining the
aforementioned Oracle Autonomous Database, claiming superiority over human-based
alternatives).
108. Bailey McCann, The Artificial-Intelligent Investor: AI Funds Beckon, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 5, 2017, 10:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-artificial-intelligent-investor-aifunds-beckon-1509937622 [https://perma.cc/8MUL-5JCU].
109. Hugh Son, Your Robo-Advisor May Have a Conflict of Interest, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (July 27, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0727/your-robo-adviser-may-have-a-conflict-of-interest [https://perma.cc/Q2CT-T2RM].
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program, called “Woebot” even provides mental therapy (albeit probably
not very well).110
The more disturbing piece of this story is the accelerating pace of
these improvements. For example, commentators are not alarmed by the
simple fact that self-driving cars are being developed and
commercialized, but that this is happening so quickly.111 A major
potential driver of this uptick in pace is “machine learning.”112 Machine
learning outsources the process of automation to machines, putting
machines in charge of automating complex, labor-intensive processes
without significant human involvement, and with greater speed and
accuracy than humans could ever achieve.113 As Professors Erik
Brynjolfsson and Tom Mitchell put it, machine learning permits
“automating automation.”114
Besides contributing to the increasing pace of improvements in
automation, machine learning may alter the landscape of invention itself.
If machines are now capable of generating patentable inventions, this
means inventors are no longer always human.115 This, too, has the
potential to exacerbate technological unemployment. As explained
further in Part II, intellectual property-generating companies like Google
and Tesla are a big part of today’s technological employment story. They
are responsible for creating jobs with comparatively high wages for
engineers and scientists capable of obtaining patents and copyrights.116
110. Megan Molteni, The Chatbot Therapist Will See You Now, WIRED (June 7, 2017,
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/06/facebook-messenger-woebot-chatbot-therapist/
[https://perma.cc/TU57-QA5K].
111. See, e.g., Tim Higgins, Driverless-Car Companies Try to Rev Their Engines on
Commercial Prospects, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2018, 3:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
driverless-car-companies-try-to-rev-their-engines-on-commercial-prospects-1515416403
[https://perma.cc/HQ6X-PXL8].
112. Erik Brynjolfsson & Tom Mitchell, What Can Machine Learning Do? Workforce
Implications, 358 SCIENCE 1530, 1530 (2017).
113. Id. at 1531.
114. See id.; see also Byron Spice, Machine Learning Will Change Jobs, CARNEGIE MELLON
UNIV. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.cmu.edu/news/stories/archives/2017/december/machinelearning-study.html [https://perma.cc/8SSW-3KEE] (providing commentary by the source’s
author about effects of automation in future job markets and examples of what job types would
not be a good fit for automation).
115. See generally Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the
Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV., 1079, 1079–80, 1083–84 (2016) (recounting the
emergence of creative AI’s relationship with the Patent Office and AI’s proven abilities to
independently create new, innovative works).
116. Google is considered one of the top places to work in the country. Rachel Gillett, The
50 Best Places to Work in 2018, According to Employees, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 6, 2017, 8:51 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/best-places-to-work-2018-2017-12#5-google-46 [https://perma.cc/
695A-892D]. It employs around 88,110 employees. Number of Full-Time Alphabet Employees
from 2007 to 2017, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/273744/ number-of-full-time-

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [], Art. 2

322

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

But, if machines are the inventors of the future, then these drivers of highwage employment would go away too.
2. Limits to Demand as a Driver of Technological Employment
Demand-boosting relies on the idea that more productivity leads to
lower prices, which leads to more consumption, which leads to more
hiring. But the demand-boosting mechanism has inherent limits—which
some worry may be reached in the not too distant future.117
First, consumers’ demand for products and services itself has limits.
As Professor Bessen has discussed, the degree to which automation will
boost employment depends on how much a decrease in price actually
enhances consumers’ demand for an output.118 Although this mechanism
works when consumers respond to decreases in price by buying more of
the output (that is, prices for the output are elastic), it does not work as
well in more satiated markets like food or clothing, where decreasing the
price does not lead people to buy more because they already have enough
(that is, prices are inelastic).119 In some industries, there could be a point
at which demand and hiring begin to flatten out, despite falling prices due
to automation.120
A second, related downward push on demand-boosting comes from
the fact that “robots don’t consume.”121 Demand-boosting implicitly
relies on human consumers to drive demand outputs. But, if more human
jobs become automated, workers will be robots, not humans, and there
will be fewer and fewer humans earning disposable income to spend and
drive demand and further hiring.122
google-employees/ [https://perma.cc/KE2Z-5WKJ]. For more details on the prospects of IPgenerators, see Part III.C.
117. Rifkin explains that adherence to the “trickle down technology argument” (what this
Article refers to as “demand-boosting”) has revealed the theory does not hold up when put to the
test. RIFKIN, supra note 31, at 15. “[T]he conventional economic wisdom has been that new
technologies boost productivity, lower the costs of production, and increase the supply of cheap
goods, which, in turn, stimulates purchasing power, expands markets, and generates more
jobs. . . . Its logic is now leading to unprecedented levels of . . . unemployment, a precipitous
decline in consumer purchasing power, and the specter of a worldwide depression of incalculable
magnitude and duration.” Id.
118. Bessen, supra note 50, at 2–3
119. Id. at 5–6.
120. Id. at 15; see also RIFKIN, supra note 31, at 7 (describing how certain industries and
position types are particularly vulnerable to employment loss); Autor, supra note 35, at 7
(discussing the limits to demand as the driver of employment); Brynjolfsson & Mitchell, supra
note 112, at 1533 (noting that automation’s impact on employment depends in part on the “price
elasticity” of demand).
121. See, e.g., FORD, supra note 31, at 196–97.
122. See, e.g., id. at 197; see also Brynjolfsson & Mitchell, supra note 112, at 1534
(“Automation may change the total income for some individuals or the broader population . . .
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A final barrier to demand-boosting is that not all markets will see a
decrease in prices just because costs go down. As Bessen notes, a crucial
assumption behind demand-boosting is that markets are competitive, not
monopolistic.123 If barriers to entry—for example, intellectual property—
prevent competition from driving down prices, this would hinder
demand-boosting still further.124 Imagine that the use of intellectual
property had permitted companies to keep prices high and to restrict
output during the Industrial Revolution, when automated looms lowered
costs and increased demand for items like clothing. Maybe the clothing
industry would not have expanded as much and hiring would not have
risen.125
3. Decreasing Quality of Remaining Human Work
Some commentators are skeptical of these fears. They contend that we
should have faith that innovation will create new jobs we cannot yet
imagine.126 But modern technological unemployment is not just about
technology’s impact on the overall quantity of jobs. It’s about
technology’s impact on the quality of jobs.
Technological change can either augment or diminish human work.127
Augmentation, on its own, is a very good thing. Workers become more
productive and their performance is enhanced, sometimes to superhuman
[and thus] change demand for some types of goods and the derived demand for the tasks needed
to produce those goods.”).
123. See, e.g., Bessen, supra note 50 (“If we assume that rapid productivity growth generated
rapid price declines in competitive product markets, then these price declines would be a major
source of demand growth.” (emphasis added)).
124. See Lemley, supra note 14, at 497–99 (arguing intellectual property may be used to
artificially preserve monopolies as the costs of production fall).
125. For what actually happened, see BESSEN, supra note 24, at 97 (“With progressively
lower costs, prices fell, consumers demanded more cotton cloth per capita, and there was more
demand for weavers.”).
126. See Lemley, supra note 14, at 512–15 (opining that, even in a world where people are
no longer needed to produce goods and services, people will have new jobs to do); Daniel Hemel,
Bringing the Basic Income Back to Earth, NEW RAMBLER REV. (Sept. 19, 2016),
http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/economics/bringing-the-basic-income-back-toearth#.V-RzhtMTcdc.twitter [https://perma.cc/GC4B-3M84] (reviewing ANDY STERN & LEE
KRAVITZ, RAISING THE FLOOR: HOW A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME CAN RENEW OUR ECONOMY AND
REBUILD THE AMERICAN DREAM (2016) and CHARLES MURRAY, IN OUR HANDS: A P LAN TO
REPLACE THE WELFARE STATE (Revised & Updated ed., 2016)) (“[A]dvances in artificial
intelligence will lead to some job losses in the coming years. But these advances will also lead to
new jobs . . . .”); see also Kaplan, supra note 82 (casting doubt on the ability of machines to
perform many essential tasks in today’s economy).
127. See, e.g., Brynjolfsson & Mitchell, supra note 112, at 1531 (explaining that machine
learning can make certain jobs less valuable and others more valuable as it “augment[s] human
capabilities”).
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levels.128 Several major professions are augmented by machines.
Affected professionals include, to name a few, mechanical engineers,
chief executive officers, and microbiologists—all of whom stand to
benefit from technologies that complement, rather than replace, their skill
sets.129 One extreme example is the “quants” who manipulate electronic
trading algorithms to achieve much higher returns than ordinary traders
and analysts.130 Another example is certain doctors, who use artificial
intelligence to make more accurate diagnoses or perform surgery.131
Some lawyers, too, benefit immensely from technology that facilitates
case law research.132
Diminution, on the other hand, occurs when technology substantially
reduces demand for workers’ skills, and reduces their wages
accordingly.133 Even when technology does not wipe out someone’s
profession, it can turn them into, basically, an automaton, there mainly to
“fill in gaps” left over by machines.134 The manufacturing sector provides
some depressing examples. A recent New Yorker article, for instance,
describes the workplace of a large manufacturer of office furniture that
128. The notion that technology will augment some professions, but not others, is the thesis
of several recent books. See, e.g., THOMAS DAVENPORT & JULIA KIRBY, ONLY HUMANS NEED
APPLY: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE AGE OF SMART MACHINES 65–66 (2016); see also Jeanne
Meister, Future of Work: Three Ways to Prepare for the Impact of Intelligent Technologies in
Your Workplace, FORBES (July 6, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeannemeister/2016/
07/06/future-of-work-three-ways-to-prepare-for-the-impact-of-intelligent-technologies-in-yourworkplace/ [https://perma.cc/E3TJ-3M9V] (discussing how “intelligent technologies” will
enhance workplace productivity).
129. Frey & Osborne, supra note 33, app. A tbl. at 270.
130. Gregory Zuckerman & Bradley Hope, The Quants Run Wall Street Now, WALL ST. J.
(May 21, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-quants-run-wall-street-now-1495389108
[https://perma.cc/4JTM-6TGA].
131. Tom Sullivan, Cognitive Computing Will Democratize Medicine, IBM Watson Officials
Say, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Apr. 27, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/
cognitive-computing-will-democratize-medicine-ibm-watson-officials-say [https://perma.cc/
RQH2-KKFJ] (“Artificial intelligence tools will augment physicians’ jobs . . . .”); see also Tim
O’Reilly, Don’t Replace People. Augment Them, MEDIUM (July 17, 2016),
https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/dont-replace-people-augment-them [https://perma.cc/5A5BXXZE] (“My eyes were fixed by an augmented surgeon able to do something that had been
previously impossible.”).
132. See Karen Turner, Meet ‘Ross,’ the Newly Hired Legal Robot, WASH. POST (May 16,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/05/16/meet-ross-the-newlyhired-legal-robot/ [https://perma.cc/8SZQ-V8VA]; see also ROSS INTELLIGENCE, http://www.ross
intelligence.com [https://perma.cc/HJR2-PZRN] (providing an example of legal research
technological advancements).
133. See e.g., FORD, supra note 31, at 3.
134. See, e.g., Brynjolfsson & Mitchell, supra note 112, at 1531; see also FORD, supra note
31, at 3 (concluding that human job quality is decreasing due to such technology).
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introduced computerized work stations and computer-assisted arms.135
Sometimes called “meat robots” by their own peers, employees now
“follow a strict automated protocol,” for which they “need little
training.”136 “Even the drill [used to affix parts of furniture being
assembled] [is] attached to a computer-assisted arm; the worker just [has]
to move it to the right position and let the machine do its magic.”137 A
decade ago, the article concludes, “industrial robots assisted workers in
their tasks. Now workers—those who remain—assist the robots in
theirs.”138
Diminution can happen to high-skill as well as low-skill jobs. For
example, translating languages was once the sole domain of skilled
human translators.139 But thanks to improving translation technologies,
“[i]t is much easier for machines (and humans) to translate between
closely related languages.”140 Humans are not fully replaced because
some translations are too complex or context-specific for machines to do
alone.141 However, for many purposes, “Google Translate is faster,
cheaper, and often as good as a human interpreter.”142 Human translators
are used merely to “clean up” the work of automated translation tools.143
4. Rising Inequality in Who Has What Jobs
One of the most disturbing pieces of modern technological
un/employment is that the impact of technology differs drastically for
different members of society.144 The result is that even if technology
135. Sheelah Kolhatkar, Welcoming Our New Robot Overlords, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/23/welcoming-our-new-robot-overlords
[https://perma.cc/ZWB5-84NQ].
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Translation Platforms Cannot Replace Humans: But They are Still Astonishingly
Useful, ECONOMIST (Apr. 29, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/books-andarts/21721357-they-are-still-astonishingly-useful-translation-platforms-cannot-replace-humans
[https://perma.cc/FJ9P-Z5RD].
140. Id.
141. Id. (“Literature requires far too supple an understanding of the author’s intentions and
culture for machines to do the job. And for critical work—technical, financial or legal, say—small
mistakes (of which even the best systems still produce plenty) are unacceptable . . . .”).
142. Greg Ip, We Survived Spreadsheets, and We’ll Survive AI, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2017,
11:47
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/wesurvived-spreadsheets-and-well-survive-ai1501688765 [https://perma.cc/7KYP-4CCU].
143. Why Translators Have the Blues: A Profession Under Pressure, ECONOMIST (May 27,
2017), https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21722609-profession-under-pressurewhy-translators-have-blues [https://perma.cc/YT66-D63P].
144. See BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 28, at 39 (“Even when technological
progress increases productivity and overall wealth, it can also affect the division of rewards,
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creates more new jobs than it destroys on net, these net gains are not
equally distributed.145
The main disparity comes from the thesis that technological change is
“skill-biased.”146 According to economics professors Claudia Goldin and
Lawrence Katz “the central idea . . . is that certain technologies are
difficult for workers and consumers to master, at least initially.”147
“[E]mployees who are slow to grasp new tools will not be promoted and
might see their earnings reduced. Those who are quicker will be
rewarded.”148 The upshot is that “low-skill” workers—generally, people
with lower levels of formal education—are left behind or made obsolete
by machines, but “high-skill” workers—people with higher levels of
formal education—are rewarded.149
In their recent book, Race Against the Machine, economists Erik
Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee show that this thesis is supported by
historical data on the correlation between wages and education level.150
“Over the past 40 years,” they write, “weekly wages for those with a high
school degree have fallen and wages for those with a high school degree
and some college have stagnated. On the other hand, college-educated
workers have seen significant gains, with the biggest gains going to those
who have completed graduate training . . . .”151 Brynjolfsson and McAfee
link this unequal distribution of gains mainly to machines and
automation, rather than to other trends such as globalization.152
5. Inability of Education to Keep Pace
The fact that technology favors higher-skilled workers would not in
itself be a problem if everyone had the skills necessary to be a winner.
However, according to Goldin and Katz, education in the United States
has not kept pace with technological advancement, leaving a gap between
potentially making some people worse off than they were before the innovation.”). The book
further explains this issue. Id. at 36–47 (discussing various “winners and losers” ushered in by
advances in technology).
145. See id. at 39–40.
146. Id. at 39; see also Autor & Salomons, supra note 73, at 48 (discussing how wage loss
for less educated workers is “typically attributed to skill-biased demand shifts”); GREENHALGH &
ROGERS, supra note 42, at 268 (“[T]he predominant view is that high-skilled workers are
complementary to high-technology capital and knowledge stocks, while those with lower skills
are substitutes for capital.”).
147. GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 70, at 90.
148. Id. Frey and Osborne discuss Goldin and Katz’s large body work in Frey & Osborne,
supra note 33, at 257.
149. GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 70, at 94–98.
150. Id. at 94–99.
151. BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 28, at 39–40.
152. Id. at 4–9, 39–42.
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the demand for educated workers and the supply.153 They call this the
“race between technology and education.”154 The result of technology
winning the race is a “skills gap”: higher demand for people with a certain
skill set than there is supply.155
In theory, education could resolve the skills gap and alleviate
inequality by bringing the unskilled to the level of the skilled. However,
under Goldin and Katz’s framework, if improvements in automation
continue at the same or an increasing rate, education may improve too
slowly to help people gain the skills required to work with future
technologies. Moreover—returning to the points made above about
machines’ increasingly impressive range of capabilities and the limits to
demand as a driver of remaining human employment—even assuming
perfect education, there simply may not be enough jobs to go around.156
Martin Ford provides a compelling, albeit disturbing, visual depiction of
this scenario. He depicts the historic job market like a pyramid, with
many low-skill jobs at the bottom, and only a few high-skill jobs at the
top.157 “It’s becoming increasingly clear,” Ford writes, that “robots,
machine learning algorithms, and other forms of automation are gradually
going to consume much of the base of the jobs skills pyramid.”158 Even
by investing in “still more education and training,” Ford concludes, it is
unlikely that we can “cram everyone into that shrinking region at the very
top.”159 In other words, not only is education not keeping pace with
technology, but doing so may one day be an impossibility.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS A DRIVER OF TECHNOLOGICAL
UN/EMPLOYMENT
The consensus of the work discussed above is that innovation both
eliminates and creates employment and, moreover, that innovation
significantly affects the quality and distribution of jobs across the
economy.160 This Part shows that intellectual property plays a role in
153. GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 70, at 7–8, 99–102.
154. Id. at 7, 298.
155. See, e.g., Kristin Majcher, The Hunt for Qualified Workers, MIT TECH. REV.
(Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/530701/the-hunt-for-qualified-workers/
[https://perma.cc/VNU2-PCVN]. But see Andrew Weaver, The Myth of the Skills Gaps, MIT
TECH. REV. (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608707/the-myth-of-theskills-gap/ [https://perma.cc/7936-KEMM] (“[P]ersistent hiring problems are less widespread
than many pundits and industry representatives claim.”).
156. FORD, supra note 31, at 252–53 (“The numbers simply don’t work.”).
157. Id. at 252.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 252–53.
160. See supra Part I.
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generating technological un/employment, and it may contribute to these
trends.
The reader might initially think the presence or absence of intellectual
property makes no difference for employment at all. This is because
modern intellectual property rights only provide a right to exclude others
from using the covered innovation.161 Intellectual property covering a
particular technology does not give a company the right to use it, let alone
guarantee they will be successful.162 On the flip side, absent intellectual
property, companies are free to adopt innovations like drones and selfdriving cars, so long as they do not run afoul of health and safety or other
regulations.163
This intuition is wrong. The easiest way to see why is to go back in
time.
A. Privilege Regimes
Unlike today, historically, there was no question intellectual property
rights could influence employment. The U.S. patent regime has its origins
in sixteenth century Great Britain, and before that, fifteenth century
Venice.164 Back then, patents conferred the “privilege” to practice an
invention in the jurisdiction, without which the inventor could not use his
invention in the realm.165 Privilege-granting regimes made the decision
whether to confer a privilege based on a variety of factors besides an
invention’s novelty—including the invention’s likely “impact on local
labor, commerce, and prices.”166 Like early corporate charters, “patents
161. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee,
his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling
the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United
States . . . .”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following . . . .”).
162. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 343 (2010)
(noting that few patents are ever commercialized).
163. Various regulations external to intellectual property regulate the use of emerging
technologies. See, e.g., Carla Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of
Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 201
(2016) (discussing ways to regulate Bitcoin and other payments systems that operate using
“distributed ledger technology”).
164. See ROBERT MERGES & JOHN DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS
3–5 (5th ed. 2011).
165. See Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 28 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 45, 58 (2013); cf. Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?
Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 957–58
(2007) (casting doubt on the notion that early American patent rights were seen as “privileges” in
the modern sense of the term).
166. See Mario Biagioli, Patent Republic: Representing Inventions, Constructing Rights and
Authors, 73 SOC. RES. 1129, 1134 (2006); see also Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents
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were granted selectively to private developers who promised to furnish
the state with something that would contribute to economic growth or
infrastructure.”167
Therefore, if an inventor came to the sovereign seeking a patent to use
the technology in the region, and that technology was likely to have a
negative impact on the work force, it was far less likely the sovereign
would grant that patent. For example, Professor Mario Biagioli has
recounted the famous inventor Galileo’s efforts to obtain a “privilege” to
operate his new water pump—in Venice in 1594—based on his
assessment of the pump’s utility in providing an efficient way to pump
water in “[t]erminally swampy” Venice.168 One wonders whether
Venetian officials would have granted Galileo the privilege to operate his
water pump if Galileo had instead insisted his water pump’s main
advantage would be to reduce employment for Venetian farmers.
There are indeed documented instances of privilege granting regimes
denying patents for labor-displacing inventions. The Introduction
mentioned William Lee’s unsuccessful attempt to achieve a patent for his
knitting machine in England and France, which the Queen of England
predicted would bring her subjects to “ruin by depriving them of
employment.”169 Another example comes from Venice, courtesy of
Professor Stefania Fusco. The petitioner, Maria Bessea Brancaleoni,
sought a patent for “a machine that could be used to either to spin and
[sic] wind several kinds of materials.” The officials reviewing her petition
stated that the invention was “ingenious and beautiful and could easily
accomplish” what Brancaleoni had promised. However, they warned the
Signoria (the issuing authority) to be careful, because “if the device
proved to be effective (as was likely to be the case) it would be to the
detriment of the poor, because this machine would cause unemployment
among poor [women].”170
These examples demonstrate that in both England and Venice, at least
some patents were reviewed specifically for their predicted impact on
labor and were sometimes denied if found to be to detrimental to workers.
This changed in early American patent law. As Professor Biagioli and
others have observed, the U.S. Patent Act of 1790 shifted the focus of
1600–1836: How Patents Became Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177,
186–87 (2004) (describing the functionality of tangible benefits offered in patent petitions).
167. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 ARIZ. L.
REV. 263, 267 (2016); see also Hrdy, supra note 165, at 60–64, 95–96, 100–04 (discussing
consideration of social utility in state patent laws and earlier privilege regimes).
168. Biagioli, supra note 166, at 1132–33.
169. See ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 3.
170. This example is courtesy of Professor Stefania Fusco. Professor Fusco’s original
translation is on file with the author.
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patents from generating local utility in the socioeconomic sense to
disclosing new information.171 Nonetheless, in the first few decades,
employment remained a factor that was sometimes raised in discussions
surrounding patentability—for instance in assessing whether a patent met
the Patent Act’s “utility” requirement.172 Professor Oren Bracha gives the
example of Eli Whitney’s patent for his cotton gin, challenged in Whitney
v. Carter (1810).173 When the cotton gin’s utility was questioned,
Whitney’s counsel responded by cataloguing the public benefits
conferred by the cotton gin, including that the cotton gin provided “a
lucrative employment” for “[i]ndividuals who were depressed with
poverty” and “sunk in idleness.”174 This example shows not only that
inventions’ impact on employment was a valid consideration within the
U.S. patent system, but also that inventions were perceived to lead to
technological employment as well as unemployment.
B. Modern Intellectual Property
Modern intellectual property rights in the United States are not what
they were in early privilege regimes. The Patent Act, which is in this
respect representative of modern American intellectual property regimes,
no longer supplies the right or permission to practice an invention in the
jurisdiction. Instead, a patent supplies only the “right to exclude others”
from making, using, selling, or importing the covered invention for the
lifetime of the patent.175 Thus, denying intellectual property rights for a
labor-displacing innovation would not create a ban on using or adopting
the technology; it would just mean the innovator does not get the benefit
of exclusivity. What is more, today, neither the Patent Office nor courts
scrutinize the moral or economic implications of inventions when
deciding whether to grant or uphold intellectual property rights.176
171. See Biagioli, supra note 166, at 1138; see also Camilla Hrdy, State Patents As a Solution
to Underinvestment in Innovation, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 487, 493–95 (2013) (discussing the four
essential features that differentiated state patents from U.S. patents).
172. See Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intellectual Property
99–100 (June 2005) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Harvard Law School) (discussing assessment of
social utility in early nineteenth century patent law).
173. 29 F. Cas. 1070, 1071 (C.C.D. Ga. 1810); see Bracha, supra note 172, at 418–19.
174. See Whitney, 29 F. Cas. at 1072; see Bracha, supra note 172.
175. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012); see also Kewanee v. Bicron, 416 U.S 470, 480 (1974) (“The
patent laws promote [the Progress of Science and useful arts] by offering a right of exclusion for
a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time,
research, and development.”).
176. An exception is Justice Joseph Story’s so-called “moral utility” requirement, under
which an invention cannot be “injurious to the morals, the health, or the good order of society.”
Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). However, the moral utility doctrine has
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However, standard intellectual property theory suggests intellectual
property rights still have an impact on both the magnitude and the pace
of technology’s replacement of human labor. There are four major
intellectual property regimes: patents,177 copyrights,178 trade secrets,179
and trademarks.180 A primary reason government creates intellectual
property rights is to help innovators internalize the uncompensated
benefits their innovations generate for others (called positive externalities
or spillovers), so that innovators will innovate more than they otherwise
would and get society closer to the optimal level of innovation.181 More
specifically, intellectual property is thought to affect incentives to
innovate in two key ways. First, the right to exclude acts as an incentive
to invent and commercialize a given innovation by making it easier for
companies to appropriate returns by restricting copying and
competition.182 Second, the race for priority over a legal right to
exclude—particularly in patent law where one inventor achieves
universal priority—is believed to accelerate the pace at which invention
and commercialization occurs.183
To be clear, few would argue that intellectual property is a “but for”
determinant of whether, or when, an innovation is invented and adopted.
Rather, intellectual property is viewed as one of several factors that affect
companies’ decisions, and the extent to which intellectual property does
so will depend on the form of intellectual property and the context.184
When it comes to the incentive to innovate, the four intellectual property
regimes operate distinctly; but each is perceived to have an effect. Most
scholarship focuses specifically on patents’ effects on incentives to invent
been largely rejected by modern courts. See Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 1046, 1057–59 (2014).
177. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2012).
178. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–102, 106 (2012).
179. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012).
180. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1127, 1114, 1125 (2012).
181. R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1005, 1009 (2003) (asserting that intellectual
property serves to preserve incentives to generate new information in the face of inevitable
spillovers).
182. See GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 272 (observing that intellectual property
rights allow firms to achieve “excess profits that cannot be easily competed away by other firms
in the short run”).
183. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of
Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1599 (2011); see also Hrdy, infra note 185, at 32–33
(discussing theories under which patents accelerate the pace of innovation).
184. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1255 (2009)
(surveying entrepreneurs to learn how they perceive patents in various industries).
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and commercialize.185 With respect to copyrights, although most
copyright subject matter seems divorced from the types of labor-saving
innovation under discussion, an important subset of copyright subject
matter has been integral to automation: software.186 Trade secret law only
provides a right to exclude others who obtain the innovation by improper
means or in breach of a duty of confidentiality,187 but the principle by
which trade secrets operate is the same: the right to exclude is presumed
to provide, among other things, an incentive to innovate.188 Trademark’s
status as an innovation incentive is the most controversial of the four,
since trademark law’s primary goal is said to be to protect consumers
from confusion as to the source of goods and services, and only
secondarily to give sellers an incentive to invest in product “quality.”189
However, some contend trademarks provide an incentive to innovate
because trademarks help innovators prevent others from passing off their
own offerings as those of the true innovator, and in this way retain a firstmover advantage for their innovations as against potential competitors.190
With respect to each of these intellectual property regimes, the upshot
is that, when presented with the decision of whether to innovate or not
innovate, the potential innovator is at least theoretically more likely to
185. See, e.g., Camilla A. Hrdy, Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 27–39;
Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 2–3 (1992);
Ouellette, supra note 11, at 75–87.
186. Despite early objections, copyright law protects computer code as “literary works” and
also protects some functional aspects of software. See generally Pamela Samuelson, The Uneasy
Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1746, 1782 (2011) (discussing
that copyright protection is deeply entrenched in software protection).
187. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974).
188. Id. at 493 (“Trade secret law encourages the development and exploitation of those
items of lesser or different invention than might be accorded protection under the patent laws . . .
[and] promotes the sharing of knowledge . . . .”); see also Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating
the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY
783, 783–831 (1987) (providing survey evidence regarding the perceived importance of patents
and trade secrets as innovation incentives).
189. Robert Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark
Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 558 (2006); see also Mark McKenna, The Normative Foundations of
Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844–49 (2007) (providing that the goal of
trademark law is to improve the quality of information in the marketplace and reduce consumer
search costs).
190. See, e.g., GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 40 (“The signaling argument for
trademarks is linked to the basic justification for IPRs: firms would be reluctant to invest in new
product innovation if the new product could not be distinguished from imitations.”); see also
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 266 (1987) (discussing trademarks as an incentive to invest in product quality). I am
also indebted to ideas presented by Jason S. George & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette in their working
paper, entitled Trademarks as Innovation Incentives, which they presented at the Intellectual
Property Scholars Conference at Berkeley Law on August 9, 2018.
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choose to innovate due to the option for intellectual property protection,
and is likely to do so faster than in a world without intellectual property
protection.
C. Intellectual Property’s Impact on Technological Un/employment
For various reasons, economists have not studied the impact of
modern intellectual property rights on employment as widely as one
might think.191 However, pursuant to standard intellectual property
theory, intellectual property rights should be expected to have two major
effects on the process of technological un/employment192: what this
Article calls the Incentive Effect and the Distribution Effect.
1. The Incentive Effect
The Incentive Effect predicts that the incentives generated by
intellectual property laws magnify and accelerate the pace of
technological un/employment. The chance to obtain an exclusive right
increases the incentive to invent and commercialize any given innovation
at any given point in time. Within the entire universe of innovation, at
least some will be labor-saving innovations. At least some of these laborsaving innovations will end up being labor-displacing.193 Therefore, the
existence of intellectual property laws should make it more likely that any
given labor-displacing innovation will be invented, commercialized, and
adopted in industry, and increase the pace at which this occurs.194
The Incentive Effect generates a testable hypothesis. Call the entire
universe of innovation I, and call the labor-saving subset of all
innovation, IL. The Incentive Effect predicts that intellectual property
rights should, in the aggregate, increase the overall size of IL by providing
the opportunity to exclude others from using the protected innovation.
Thus, the size of IL in the presence of intellectual property rights, call it
ILIP, should be greater than the size of IL in the absence of IP, call it IL0. If
the Incentive Effect holds true, intellectual property rights increase the
size of the universe of innovations that are labor-displacing.
191. Economists’ work usually seeks to answer a different question: innovation’s impact on
employment. They view intellectual property as mere proxies for innovation itself. See, e.g., Van
Roy et al., supra note 71, at 3–4 (finding that higher levels of innovation, as measured by forwardweighted patent citations, had a positive impact on employment at firms in high-tech
manufacturing sectors).
192. Again, technological un/employment means the simultaneous creation and elimination
of jobs due to advances in technology via the mechanisms discussed in Part II.
193. See Part II.A for an explanation of labor-displacing.
194. Obviously, intellectual property is not the only factor influencing invention and
adoption of labor-saving developments. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing five factors that go into
the decision of whether to automate).
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ILIP > IL0
Proving the Incentive Effect is not as difficult as it might at first
appear, if readers are willing to assume that intellectual property has a
positive net impact on the total universe of innovation in the long run. 195
If the whole universe of innovation gets bigger, then the subset of
innovation that is labor-saving also gets much bigger, so long as there is
nothing about intellectual property that leads inventors to favor
investment in labor-creating innovations. This caveat is discussed in
greater detail below.196
One way to disprove the Incentive Effect would be if there were zero
or very few intellectual property rights obtained for labor-saving
inventions. This would suggest that intellectual property is insignificant
in the mix of factors affecting the decision to invent labor-saving
solutions to problems. However, the patent record reveals that companies
regularly seek to protect labor-saving innovations through the patent
system. There are many famous labor-saving patents from the Industrial
Revolution, such as several early patents on the steamboat, famous for
outpacing boats operated “by any other power,”197 and the cotton
harvester, advertised as “having a large capacity for work.”198 The
automated teller machine (ATM), discussed in Part II, was covered by
patents lauding its cost cutting potential.199 A search for the term “laborsaving” in Google Patents reveals over 80,000 results, such as laborsaving long arm gardening shears,200 a labor-saving materials
dispenser,201 and a labor-saving consolidated checkout system.202 The
195. In the short run, intellectual property rights would actually do the opposite: slow down
adoption of labor-saving technologies for as long as they are protected by an exclusive right. See
Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 839, 868 (1990) (discussing classic studies showing a “tradeoff between increased inventive
effort resulting from longer anticipated patent life and greater deadweight costs associated with
longer monopoly”). This conclusion assumes that intellectual property scopes and term lengths
are appropriately tailored so as to limit needless monopoly costs as well as negative impacts on
cumulative innovation. Cf. id. at 873–74 (observing difficulties of tailoring to limit costs).
196. See infra Part II.C.2.
197. See Hrdy, supra note 165, at 78, 105 (discussing John Fitch’s 1791 patent).
198. U.S. Patent No. 526,209 (filed June 17, 1893) (issued Sept. 18, 1894). The CottonHarvester’s stated objective was to produce a “simple and durable apparatus” for harvesting
cotton, “capable of operation by unskilled labor,” and “having a large capacity for work.” Id.
199. For instance, the objective of U.S. Patent No. 3,761,682, for a “Credit Card Automatic
Currency Dispenser,” was “[t]o provide the consumer with a source of ready cash without the
expense of branch banking” and to “make cash available to bank customers on a 24 hour basis.”
U.S. Patent No. 3,761,682 (filed Oct. 7, 1971).
200. U.S. Patent No. 7,530,172 B1 (filed May 30, 2007).
201. U.S. Patent No. 5,592,760 (filed July 25,1995).
202. U.S. Patent No. 5,497,853 (filed June 5, 1992).
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term “automation” yields over 300,000 results, including several recent
patents involving “sales force automation”203 and “home automation
system[s].”204 The term “autonomous vehicle” alone yields over 40,000
results, several of which are owned by Uber Technologies.205
To illustrate how labor-saving patents are presented, take NCR Corp’s
patent for a labor-saving consolidated checkout system—the self-service
checkout terminals we can now use at the grocery store and the
pharmacy.206 Observing that “the largest expenditures” in the retail
industry besides “the cost of the goods sold” are “the cost of labor
expended,” the patent then discusses at length the invention’s goal to
“reduce labor costs” associated with grocery and supermarket
transactions.207 The patent aims to reduce labor costs by “reduc[ing] the
number of occasions in which an employee of the retailer must intervene
in the customer’s transaction relative to self-service checkout terminals
which have heretofore been designed.”208 In other words, the invention’s
primary objective is to reduce the amount of labor required to perform
the task to as close to zero as possible.
The fact that a large number of labor-saving inventions have been
patented does not indicate any influence on innovation stemming from
the ease of obtaining a patent. If, instead, there were few labor-saving
inventions in the patent record, this would potentially indicate that
increased difficulty of obtaining a patent does influence innovation.
However, if these patents are having their desired effect on the amount
and pace of innovation, they also must be having a magnifying effect on
labor-saving innovation and thus on technological un/employment.
2. Caveats
It is important to emphasize that the Incentive Effect does not
hypothesize that intellectual property rights enlarge only the size of IL.
Rather, intellectual property rights enlarge the size of the entire universe
of innovation, including IL. In other words, this Article does not
necessarily claim that intellectual property’s incentive mechanism—for
203. U.S. Patent No. 7,340,410 B1 (filed June 13, 2002).
204. U.S. Patent No. 6,473,661 B1 (filed Mar. 15, 2000).
205. E.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 9,557,183 B1, 9,603,158 B1, 9,616,896 B1, 9,672,446 B1,
9,432,929 B1.
206. U.S. Patent No. 6,522,772 B1 (filed Sept. 30, 1998). The National Cash Register
Company was founded in 1884 by John H. Patterson. Company, NCR,
https://www.ncr.com/company [https://perma.cc/F8SG-GGM4]. NCR Corp. has since developed
many machines to facilitate consumer transactions, including cash registers, ATMs, and selfservice kiosks. See id. Patterson’s first patent for a cash register has a grant date of 1889. See
U.S. Patent No. 414,440 (issued Nov. 5, 1889).
207. U.S. Patent No. 6,522,772 B1 col. 1 ll. 14–20.
208. Id. col. 3 ll. 31–35.
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instance, the fact that intellectual property relies on a right to exclude209—
leads businesses to prefer labor-saving innovations over labor-creating
innovations.210
To illustrate the point by way of example, the presence of intellectual
property does not necessarily mean Google is more likely to invent a new
kind of automated car as opposed to a new kind of human-operated car.
But the presence of intellectual property does mean Google is more likely
to invent all types of new cars, including fully automated cars, and to do
so faster than it otherwise would. Note that, on the flip side, there is no
evidence to suggest that intellectual property encourages investing in
labor-creating innovations. To the contrary, as discussed in Part II.A,
market forces already encourage investing in automation, and it seems
reasonable to assume that intellectual property would magnify those
incentives. Thus, all else being equal, in this example Google would be
more likely to invent the automated car than the new kind of humanoperated one.
There is another crucial caveat. There is no guarantee that any given
labor-saving innovation will end up being labor-displacing. In the past,
new technologies from the cotton gin to the ATM ended up creating more
jobs than they destroyed, at least in net terms. Even inventions that permit
total automation of tasks, such as a fully automated vehicle, can end up
generating new tasks that people can be paid to perform. This is what
technological un/employment is all about. Again, for all the reasons
discussed in Part II.C, this does not completely solve the problem. The
long-term concern is that in the future machines will take over all
conceivable tasks—the job of the engineer who makes the vehicle as well
as the job of the driver. The more realistic, present-day concern is that the
gains from technological advances are not equally distributed. A driver
cannot become an engineer overnight; becoming an engineer takes a
lifetime of comparative privilege and resources that most people do not
have. This second point becomes very important in light of the next Part’s
argument: that intellectual property tends to exacerbate the division of
returns between technological un/employment’s winners and losers.
209. Some have argued, for instance, that patents, which provide a right to exclude in
exchange for disclosure, may lead innovators to prefer certain types of inventions that are easier
to exclude and more difficult to keep secret. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The
Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1905 (2013).
210. That said, when assessing damages in patent cases, courts have held damages may
include the profits the infringer would have expected to obtain from savings on labor. This could
mean patentees have an incentive, beyond the strong incentives they already have, to invest
specifically in inventions that save on labor costs, knowing they can recover damages based on
future infringers’ savings on labor. See, e.g., Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein’s Sons, Inc., 612
F.2d 1353, 1355–57 (3d Cir. 1980); Doten v. City of Boston, 138 F. 406, 406–07 (1st Cir. 1905).
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3. The Distribution Effect
The Distribution Effect is an outgrowth of the Incentive Effect. The
Distribution Effect has two parts. First, intellectual property increases
returns for intellectual property owners by giving them a right to exclude,
thereby increasing demand and wages for people who possess the skills
necessary to generate intellectual property (“IP-generators”). Second,
because at least some of this same intellectual property involves labordisplacing innovations, this contributes to lower demand and wages for
people whose core skills are more easily replaced by machines and who
are not capable of generating intellectual property (“non-IPgenerators”).211 The upshot is that intellectual property magnifies the
division of rewards between generators of intellectual property and the
workers whom their innovations replace.
The Distribution Effect generates at least one core hypothesis: that
demand and wages for IP-generators should be exponentially higher than
for non-IP-generators. Proving the Distribution Effect is difficult, in large
part because it is difficult to isolate intellectual property’s impact on
employment and wages as opposed to innovation’s impact.212 But several
pieces of evidence suggest that intellectual property, in specific, may
contribute to comparatively higher wages for IP-generators.
First, as already mentioned, data from the last several decades shows
a correlation between technological advances and increased wages for
“high-skill” as compared to “low-skill” workers.213 Second, evidence
shows that wages in geographic regions with high levels of innovation
and higher levels of patenting per entity—“brain hubs” like Silicon
Valley, California—tend to be higher than wages in other regions.214
211. For purposes of simplicity, workers are divided into two groups: “IP-generators,” who
generate valuable intellectual property and are not easily replaced by machines, and “non-IPgenerators,” who do not generate valuable intellectual property and whose skills are more easily
replaced by machines. This assumes IP-generators are less likely to be replaced by machines than
non-IP-generators, which is not necessarily true. It also assumes that returns from intellectual
property trickle down to IP-generators, which is also not necessarily true, since IP-generators do
not always own the intellectual property that they generate. This complexity is discussed further
below. This simplicity obviously does not map precisely onto reality; but other commentators on
this topic make similarly simplistic distinctions between “high-skill” and “low-skill” workers all
the time. See, e.g., GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 70, at 94–96.
212. The recent USPTO report stresses that this connection is tenuous. U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at i (“[O]ur methodology does not permit us to attribute
[differences in economic indicators such as employment, wages, and value added] to IP
alone . . . .”).
213. See, e.g., BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 28, at 39–40.
214. I review the connection between innovation, patenting, and wages in Hrdy, supra note
40, at 1317–22; see also MORETTI, supra note 72, at 72–97 (observing that innovation hubs have
a higher concentration of skilled workers and arguing that this leads to higher wages for the entire
community).
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Lastly and most compellingly, several studies purport to find
employees in IP-intensive industries—in which companies own more
intellectual property per size—have comparatively higher wages than
workers in other industries.215 To give just one example, the recent
USPTO report, mentioned in the Introduction, found that wages in “IPintensive” industries are forty-six percent higher than in other industries
that are not classified as IP-intensive.216
These correlations between prevalence of intellectual property and
wages are particularly interesting because they suggest that returns from
intellectual property—which go principally to the companies that own
the intellectual property, such as Alphabet—are shared with the people
who actually generate that intellectual property, such as, say, engineers
who work for Alphabet. In other words, intellectual property does not just
increase returns for owners, but also increases wages for IP-generators in
cases where ownership is divided between employer and employee.
There are several mechanisms by which intellectual property might have
this effect on wages. First, firms may “share” some of the rents from
intellectual property with employees whose skills are necessary to obtain
those rents.217 Second, firms may pay IP-generating employees more in
order to keep them from working for competitors and from sharing their
secrets.218 Third, employees may be able to more easily signal their
abilities to the job market if they can obtain intellectual property.219
Again, there is no airtight proof that intellectual property rights, in
specific, cause these higher wages. It could be that people who are IPgenerators have more education and skill than other people and are in
higher demand because they are scarcer. This Article merely suggests the
215. See GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 277 (discussing studies finding the
innovation rents variable is “a significant determinant of higher wages,” with as much as 20–30%
of rents generated through innovation going to workers).
216. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1 (“Private wage and salary workers in
IP-intensive industries continue to earn significantly more than those in non-IP-intensive
industries. In 2014, workers in IP-intensive industries earned an average weekly wage of $1,312,
46 percent higher than the $896 average weekly wages in non-IP-intensive industries in the private
sector. This wage premium has largely grown over time from 22 percent in 1990 to 42 percent in
2010 and 46 percent in 2014.”).
217. See GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 277.
218. See Andrea Contigiani et al., Trade Secrets and Innovation: Evidence from the
“Inevitable Disclosure” Doctrine, 39 STRAT. MGMT. J. 2921, 2925 (2018); Jonathan M. Barnett
& Ted Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in Innovation Markets 30 (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch.,
Working Paper No. 207, 2016), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/76907918.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TQE2-LGDL].
219. For instance, it is theorized that inventors of high-quality patents can obtain higher
wages when they are able to signal their skills to other firms. See Contigiani et al., supra note 218,
at 2925–26 n.6 (assuming that “high-skill inventors” with the ability to produce “high-quality
patents” receive a wage premium).
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possibility that one reason these people are paid so well is that they are
capable of generating intellectual property that will give their employers
a legal right to exclude others.
4. The Case of Self-Driving Cars
Leaving aside aggregate data, the most compelling evidence for the
impact of intellectual property on technological un/employment may be
a contemporary case study: self-driving cars.220 Corporations are pouring
billions of dollars into self-driving car research, and the U.S. government
is contemplating following suit.221 Start-ups can raise millions to develop
self-driving vehicle technology.222 Salaries for experts in this field, such
as roboticists and engineers, are startlingly high.223
Why is there so much money pouring into self-driving cars? The
fundamental reason is presumably that self-driving cars can bring
tremendous value to businesses, which can use them to reduce costs and
improve speed, safety, and accuracy.224 Companies cannot develop the
product or compete with others in the industry unless they have top talent,
220. See generally Samuel D. Adkisson, System-Level Standards: Driverless Cars and the
Future of Regulatory Design, 40 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2018) (discussing the future of selfdriving cars).
221. See Bill Vlasic, U.S. Proposes Spending $4 Billion on Self-Driving Cars, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/business/us-proposes-spending-4-billionon-self-driving-cars.html [https://perma.cc/KF8T-EMXG]; Toyota Spending $1B on Self-Driving
Car Research, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/06/toyota-spending-1bon-self-driving-car-research.html [https://perma.cc/2BHD-PZHA].
222. See Max Chafkin & Josh Eidelson, These Truckers Work Alongside the Coders Trying
BUSINESSWEEK
(June
22,
2017),
to
Eliminate
Their
Jobs,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-06-22/these-truckers-work-alongside-thecoders-trying-to-eliminate-their-jobs [https://perma.cc/2Q2A-SY4S]; Liza Lin, Daimler Gets a
Foothold in China’s Self-Driving Car Market, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/daimler-invests-in-beijing-based-self-driving-startup-momenta1500930180 [https://perma.cc/C94N-C3TP].
223. See Johana Buiyan, Ex-Googler Sebastian Thrun says the Going Rate for Self-Driving
Talent is $10 Million per Person, RECODE (Sept. 17, 2016, 11:30 AM), https://www.recode.net/
2016/9/17/12943214/sebastian-thrun-self-driving-talent-pool [https://perma.cc/N62K-6R97];
Cade Metz, Tech Giants are Paying Huge Salaries for Scarce A.I. Talent, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/technology/artificial-intelligence-experts-salaries.
html [https://perma.cc/996E-QGJ2].
224. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 22, at 100–01 (discussing the temptation for Uber to switch
to autonomous vehicles); Laura Stevens & Tim Higgins, Amazon Forms Team to Focus on
Driverless Technology, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2017, 8:03 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
amazon-team-focuses-on-exploiting-driverless-technology-1493035203 [https://perma.cc/
CW2G-XQGP] (discussing ways Amazon may incorporate self-driving cars into its package
delivery in order to cut costs and improve delivery service).
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so they lure workers with the prospect of huge salaries.225 But another
reason could be the expectation that, at the end of the road, these workers
will generate valuable intellectual property, including trade secrets as
well as patents, that can be used to exclude competitors or licensed to
others for high fees.226 The ability to generate intellectual property is
obviously not the only reason companies are investing in self-driving cars
or in IP-generating workers.227 But absent the chance for exclusive rights,
self-driving cars might not be quite such a profitable industry, and these
people might not be quite so well paid.
Meanwhile, the very same intellectual property that allows IP owners
to achieve higher profits, and thus IP-generators to achieve higher wages,
simultaneously threatens the jobs and earning power of truck drivers and
other people who drive for a living—non-IP generators.228 Even now, the
wage differential is striking. While base pay for engineers in the selfdriving vehicle field is well over $200,000 per year, truck drivers’ median
pay is around $40,000 per year and will presumably fall as use of
autonomous trucks is increasingly adopted.229
This difference might not be problematic if the numbers were
different—if there were more jobs available for people to be engineers
working on autonomous vehicles than there were for people to be truck
drivers. But at least currently, companies developing autonomous
vehicles hire comparatively few human workers in relation to the
companies’ net worth.230 The American Trucking Association reports
that “there are approximately 3.5 million professional truck drivers in the
225. For instance, Anthony Levandowski sold Otto to Uber for $700 million. Robotocists
from Carnegie Mellon came on board, lured away from academia with huge salaries. See Johana
Bhuiyan, Inside Uber’s Self-Driving Car Mess, RECODE (Mar. 24, 2017, 4:35 PM),
http://www.recode.net/2017/3/24/14737438/uber-self-driving-turmoil-otto-travis-kalanick-civilwar [https://perma.cc/FM4X-SD94].
226. See Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 17-00939 WHA, 2017 WL 2123560, at
*1–2, *7 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017) (bringing claims against Uber for theft of trade secrets under
state and federal law); cf. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 439 (2004)
(noting that the decision to litigate patents may be representative of their perceived value).
227. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the fundamentals affecting the decision to automate);
supra Part I.C.5 (discussing the skills gap).
228. See Chafkin & Eidelson, supra note 222.
229. Id.; see also Alan Ohnsman, Autonomous Car Race Creates $400k Engineering Jobs
for Top Silicon Valley Talent, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2017, 12:33 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
alanohnsman/2017/03/27/autonomous-car-race-creates-400k-engineering-jobs-for-top-siliconvalley-talent/#5fe9355814a3 [https://perma.cc/ACP5-5D3W] (discussing salaries of self-driving
car engineers).
230. See WEST, supra note 34, at 6 (“Many of the large tech firms have achieved broad
economic scale without a large number of employees.”); see also Chafkin & Eidelson, supra note
222 (“[Otto] had fewer than 100 employees when Uber Technologies Inc. acquired it for $700
million.”).
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United States.”231 Even if the United States could successfully retrain
former drivers to be engineers, there would not be enough jobs to go
around.232
III. THE CASE FOR A PRO-EMPLOYMENT INNOVATION POLICY
Part II argued that intellectual property facilitates and accelerates the
pace of technological un/employment and exacerbates inequality
between developers of labor-displacing innovations and others who are
displaced by them. If accurate, this thesis complicates the conventional
view that intellectual property rights “create jobs.”233 It is more accurate
to say that intellectual property rights spur innovation, and that this
innovation both creates and destroys jobs.
This raises a normative issue. Should the government adopt policies
to alleviate unemployment and inequality brought about by technological
change? For instance, should the government do anything about the truck
drivers who lose their jobs when self-driving cars become the norm?
Some might say “do nothing.” Innovation increases productivity,
provides consumers a better lifestyle, and is good for the economy in the
long run.234 The fact that innovation has negative as well as positive
effects on society is the price of progress. However, that response is
unlikely to satisfy the many commentators mentioned in Part I who
believe technological change is having an increasingly negative impact
on the quality and distribution of work.235 Moreover, as revealed in Part
II, government-granted intellectual property rights actually exacerbate
these problems by increasing the returns from innovation. It is therefore
conceivable that in the near future, some legislators will seek to use
intellectual property as a policy tool to address concerns surrounding
technological un/employment. As this Part shows, the main way the
231. Truck Drivers in the USA, ALLTRUCKING.COM, http://www.alltrucking.com/faq/truckdrivers-in-the-usa/ [https://perma.cc/LL8D-V49H]. The total number of people employed in the
industry, including those in positions that do not entail driving, “exceeds 8.7 million.” Id.; see
also Ben Leubsdorf, Self-Driving Cars Could Transform Jobs Held by 1 in 9 U.S. Workers, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2017, 10:18 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2017/08/14/self-driving-carscould-transform-jobs-held-by-1-in-9-u-s-workers/
[https://perma.cc/3Z4K-LGAE]
(noting
Commerce Department economists predict the approximately 3.8 million people who drive taxis,
trucks, and other vehicles for a living may either be displaced or see their wages fall drastically).
232. See supra Part I.C.5.
233. See Leahy, supra note 12.
234. See, e.g., JOSH LERNER, THE ARCHITECTURE OF INNOVATION: THE ECONOMICS OF
CREATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 16 (2012) (“Innumerable studies have documented the strong
connection between new discoveries and economic prosperity across nations and over time.”).
235. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 22, at 309–12 (concluding that employment law should
intervene to alleviate the plight of workers in a world of increasing automation); see also
discussion supra Part I.C (discussing these commentators and their perspectives).
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government could do so is by using the intellectual property regime,
likely in combination with the tax system, to reduce the amount of labordisplacing innovations in the economy and mitigate the impacts of those
innovations on workers.236
Anticipating this development, this Part assesses the main policy
mechanisms by which the government could, if it chooses, intervene to
alleviate the effects of technological un/employment.
But first, this Article must address certain threshold objections.
A. Threshold Objections
1. The “Productivity is Everything” Objection
The first objection—the “productivity is everything” objection—is
that any policy with the goal of increasing, rather than reducing, the
amount of human labor required to complete a task must by definition
make companies and individuals less productive, and therefore retard
economic growth.237 As Professor Daniel Hemel puts this argument,
the ratio of economic outputs (in dollars) to human labor
inputs (in hours) is the very definition of labor productivity.
And gross domestic product is simply hours worked times
labor productivity. . . . If we want GDP growth, then we
either have to work longer hours (which doesn’t sound fun)
or raise labor productivity.
....
. . . [S]o if a “robot” is simply an innovation that reduces
the ratio of human labor inputs to economic outputs
significantly, then what we need is robots galore.238
In other words, argues Professor Hemel, the government should not
be using policy to reduce the amount of labor-saving innovation in the
economy, but to increase it. Doing the opposite—say, taxing businesses
that employ robots—would be grave error. Not only would it become
generally more difficult to start a business,239 but companies, and
innovators, would be forced to direct resources towards solutions that are
236. See infra Part III.C.3.a.
237. See Daniel Hemel, Should Robots Be Subsidized? Probably, MEDIUM (Aug. 17, 2017),
https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/should-robots-be-subsidized-18909e1fdb64
[https://perma.cc/YT43-NZG4].
238. Id. (“As Paul Krugman puts it: ‘Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is
almost everything.’”).
239. Professor Cooter, for instance, argues that one reason for the comparative poverty of
certain nations is that the state places a “heavy regulatory burden” on entrepreneurs seeking to
create new companies and therefore hinders economic growth. Robert Cooter, Innovation,
Information, and the Poverty of Nations, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373, 387–88 (2005).
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less efficient, costing more per unit of output. For example, businesses
might use humans instead of robots even when robots are far cheaper or
better suited to the task. Research firms might invest in comparatively
inefficient technological solutions like multi-human-driven motor
vehicles in order to obtain some government subsidy or avoid running
afoul of some new tax or regulation.
And this is not all. Professor Bessen, whose work was discussed in
Part I.B, might add that if government guides investment away from
labor-saving solutions, then workers would no longer have incentives to
educate themselves appropriately for the technologies of the future.240
Secure in the sense that the government will not let them be automated
out of work, workers might not work as hard to train themselves and
become more productive. Why bother training for a future job
maintaining or interfacing with robots when you can just keep driving for
a living?241 In short, markets would no longer deliver accurate signals to
people about what occupations to train for.242
This might not be so terrible if the government actually succeeds in
halting automation in its tracks. Businesses in the jurisdiction would be
less efficient, but so would everyone else. Yet, economic growth is not
determined in a vacuum. Assuming significant levels of global
competition are permitted—a certainty in today’s world of increasing
globalization243—any nation that adopts policies to discourage labordisplacing innovations, like self-driving cars, would face competition
from neighbors that do not invoke such a policy. That country would fall
behind others and see its economy falter in comparison.244
240. See BESSEN, supra note 24, at 102–04 (discussing importance and difficulty of learning
skills needed to operate labor-reducing innovations such as power looms).
241. See Daniela Hernandez, Seven Jobs Robots Will Create—or Expand, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
29, 2018, 10:07 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/seven-jobs-robots-will-createor-expand1525054021 [http://perma.cc/VH3T-SFG2].
242. See Weaver, supra note 155 (arguing that, when it comes to predicting which skills will
be needed in the economy, “there is no substitute for coordination between the supply side of the
labor market (workers and their skill investments) and the demand side (employers and their skill
requirements)”).
243. SUZANNE BERGER & MIT INDUS. PERFORMANCE CTR., HOW WE COMPETE: WHAT
COMPANIES AROUND THE WORLD ARE DOING TO MAKE IT IN TODAY’S GLOBAL ECONOMY 9 (2005)
(defining “globalization” as “changes in the international economy and in domestic economies”
in the direction of a “single global market,” in which wages, prices, and interest rates are the same
around the world).
244. A historic analogy is France’s agenda to create jobs in the 1970s, including subsidizing
industries “most likely to hire large numbers of workers”—all of which left France unable “to
adapt to a world of rapid technological change and intense global competition.” MARC LEVINSON,
AN EXTRAORDINARY TIME: THE END OF THE POSTWAR BOOM AND THE RETURN OF THE ORDINARY
ECONOMY 204 (2016); see also Liz Alderman, French Companies Have Newfound
Freedom . . . to Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/
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2. The Hayekian Objection
The second objection—the “Hayekian objection”—is that even if
reducing or slowing the pace of labor-displacing innovation were
desirable, the government lacks the capacity to do so.245 As Professor
Amy Kapczynski has observed, intellectual property scholarship is
deeply influenced by the Hayekian view that, all else being equal, free
markets should be preferred over the government for allocating resources
because the government lacks knowledge of what types of goods are
needed and how much of them to supply.246 If the government were to
begin dictating which types of innovations to pursue—telling businesses
to invest in human-operated machines, for instance—this would amount
to precisely the sort of “industrial policy”247 that governments seek to
avoid by adopting technology-neutral intellectual property systems in
lieu of direct government financing for innovation.248 On this view, if the
government were to restructure innovation policy to alleviate the effects
of technological un/employment, this would reverse a major benefit of
using intellectual property in the first place by exposing the incentive
system to government influence.
B. Justifications for Intervention
Given these concerns, we might think no country should or would
adopt a policy that seeks to reduce, rather than to increase, the amount of
labor-displacing innovations in the marketplace. Yet there are several
business/france-labor-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/6S8Q-GLPF] (discussing recent regulatory
changes in France making it easier to hire and fire workers in France in order to revive growth).
245. Friedrich Hayek was an Austrian economist famous for objecting to John Maynard
Keynes’ view that government should subsidize demand in order to stimulate spending and
employment. See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519,
519, 524, 530 (1945) (arguing a “single mind” cannot produce a solution to economic problems
the same way interactions between all people in the market can); see also NICHOLAS WAPSHOTT,
KEYNES HAYEK: THE CLASH THAT DEFINED MODERN ECONOMICS 43–44 (2011) (discussing the
fundamental differences in Hayek and Keynes beliefs).
246. Amy Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131,
134 (2014) (“[T]he conventional theory [of IP law] . . . implicitly invokes a Hayekian hypothesis
about information asymmetries.”).
247. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 239, at 378–79 (arguing that government “manipulations”
of the market in the form of taxes, subsidies, and regulations amount to “industrial policy” or
“technology policy,” in which government unwisely seeks to guide market decisions).
248. See Hrdy, supra note 40, at 1303–04; see also Kapczynski, supra note 246 (discussing
the government creates intellectual property rights and is “incapable of effectively engaging more
directly in the organization of information production”); Daniel Hemel & Lisa Ouellette, Beyond
the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 327 (2013) (discussing the distinction between
“market-set” and “government-set” innovation incentives).
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justifications for intervention. These justifications may give pause to even
the fiercest skeptics of government intervention in markets.249
1. Correcting Externalities
The first justification is that labor-displacing innovations generate
negative externalities. A negative externality is a cost conveyed to others
that is not represented in a market transaction.250 Pollution is a classic
example. Imagine a factory that emits pollution into the environment
when it manufactures its products. The true costs of the factory’s
activity—to the earth or to people who live close to the factory—are
“external” to the market in the sense that they are not taken into account
in the factory’s decision to engage in the polluting activity.251 Taxation is
often posited as a way to force companies to “internalize” these negative
externalities.252 The factory in this example would likely pollute less if it
were subject to a pollution tax.
Some commentators have asserted that technologies that permit
automation, such as factory robots, impose negative externalities on
others—not unlike pollution. As two well-known economists put the
argument, “automating tasks reduces employment . . . and this has a firstorder effect on workers . . . . [I]innovators do not internalize this
externality.”253
249. Cf. Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, Atlas Nods: The Libertarian Case for a
Basic Income, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (defending a “universal basic income” against
objections from libertarians); see also N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS
11–13 (6th ed. 2012) (discussing common “market failures” that might warrant government
intervention in markets).
250. See Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices:
Should Doctors Pay Less?, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 7 (2006); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley,
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 262 (2007) (“[P]ositive (or negative) externalities are
benefits (costs) realized by one person as a result of another person’s activity without payment
(compensation). Externalities generally are not fully factored into a person’s decision to engage
in the activity.”); see also MANKIW, supra note 249, at 12 (“[A]n externality . . . is the impact of
one person’s actions on the well-being of a bystander.”).
251. Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 250, at 300.
252. E.g., Cooter & Porat, supra note 250, at 1, 24; Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 249, at
1232.
253. Daron Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo, The Race Between Machine and Man:
Implications of Technology for Growth, Factor Shares and Employment 30 (NBER, Working
Paper No. 22,252, 2016), http://cdi.mecon.gov.ar/bases/doc/nber/w22252.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YGJ4-XNQY]. For other examples, see Loren Nerhus, Automation and the Labor Force, 16
MAJOR THEMES ECON. 65, 66 (2014) (“Even though everyone in society benefits from
improvements in technology, it does create negative externalities for some segments in the short
run.”); Ernest Chi-Hin Ng, Taxing the Robots and Other Externalities, BUDDHISTDOOR
GLOBAL (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.buddhistdoor.net/features/taxing-the-robots-and-otherexternalities [https://perma.cc/4S64-HJMR] (“[T]echnology is creating new jobs but it is also
destroying some old ones even faster. . . . In economics, negative consequences not directly
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This assertion at first appears counterintuitive. After all, innovation is
the opposite of pollution, generating positive rather than negative
externalities in the form of new ideas that benefit others. According to
the theoretical framework associated with Harold Demsetz, the primary
purpose of patent and copyright laws is to permit companies to internalize
the benefits of their creations in order to encourage them to innovate,
notwithstanding the fact that others will benefit from their ideas.254 Yet,
as Demsetz himself observed, these very same ideas can also create
negative externalities for those whose livelihoods are tied up in ideas that
are now obsolete.255 Technological un/employment is merely a species of
this general problem. New inventions that permit increased automation
may destroy the jobs of human workers who were previously needed to
perform those tasks.
Importantly, the company generating the externality here is not
typically the employer that chooses to adopt a new machine in lieu of
workers in order to reduce its costs—for instance, the lettuce farmer who
decides to use a machine to harvest crops instead of humans in order to
avoid paying their wages.256 A true externality, like pollution, is a
negative effect on bystanders “who are not participating in the relevant
market and thus have not transacted with the provider of the benefits or
costs.”257 In this case, the lettuce farmer imposes no externalities on
others who are not already taken into account in the transaction. The
workers the farmer lets go do participate in the transaction to the extent
they control the wages they demand for their labor. At least theoretically,
they can demand lower wages in order to avoid being displaced by the
machine, assuming the transaction costs involved in negotiating this
outcome are not too high.258
accounted for in a transaction, but borne by other third parties (society, future generations, the
ecology, and so forth), are known as negative externalities.”).
254. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 359
(1967) (“If we extend some degree of private rights to the originators, these ideas will come forth
at a more rapid pace.”); see also Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2005) (discussing how externalities in intellectual property are
positive not negative).
255. Demsetz, supra note 254 (“[T]he existence of the private rights [for the originators of
ideas] does not mean that their effects on the property of others will be directly taken into account.
A new idea makes an old one obsolete and another old one more valuable.”).
256. William M. Blair, Farms Reaping a Harvest with Automation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
10, 1964), https://www.nytimes.com/1964/04/10/farms-reaping-a-harvest-with-automation.html
[https://perma.cc/G5PK-Y5DA].
257. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 250.
258. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960); see also
MANKIW, supra note 249, at 210–12 (illustrating this concept).
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This is sometimes referred to as a “pecuniary externality” versus a
“technological externality.”259 A technological externality, such as
pollution imposed on the inanimate environment, occurs outside the
market; a pecuniary externality is a wealth transfer between private
parties that occurs within the market.260 As Professors Brett Frischmann
and Mark Lemley explain, “economists don’t much care about pecuniary
externalities, reasoning that wealth transfers ‘within’ the market—that is,
externalities mediated by the price mechanism—result in offsetting
private costs and benefits.”261
But there are arguably more than pecuniary externalities at work in
the process of technological un/employment. There are technological
externalities as well.262 The pollution-spewing factory in this scenario is
not the employer who merely adopts new machinery to save on costs. It
is the innovator who develops the labor-displacing invention. The driving
force behind this technological externality is the same as the driving force
that motivates government to create intellectual property rights: the fact
that the innovation can eventually be copied and used by other businesses
across the economy.263 Thanks in part to intellectual property rights,
innovators can now be compensated through the sale and licensing of
their inventions.264 As discussed above in Part II.C, the owners of this
intellectual property, such as Eli Whitney, NCR Corp., Google, and Uber,
profit. But they do not internalize the full costs that those same inventions
impose on workers across the economy—workers whose skills are now
made obsolete by the advancement of technology.265
If it is true that labor-displacing innovations create negative
externalities for workers, then policymakers might be justified in
imposing measures to force innovators to internalize the externalities.
The economists quoted above, for instance, theorize that “the social
planner will need to impose a tax on automation . . . in order to combat
the tendency of the decentralized equilibrium to automate
259. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 250, at 262–63.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 263.
262. Id. at 262 (“Technological externalities are direct benefits (or costs) realized by third
parties—agents who are not participating in the relevant market and thus have not transacted with
the provider of the benefits or costs.”).
263. Id. at 272–73 (“Ideas can be freely copied by others in the absence of a legal rule
restricting that copying without depriving their creators of the use of the ideas.”).
264. See id. at 273 (“A patent licensee . . . is buying the right not to be sued for using the
knowledge she did have, whether because she developed it independently or because she learned
it from the inventor’s use.”).
265. Demsetz, supra note 254; see also BESSEN, supra note 24, at 19–20 (suggesting that
technology generates market failures in education).
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excessively.”266 The result of such a tax should be that innovators will
generate fewer labor-displacing innovations in order to avoid incurring
the tax. If they choose to innovate anyway, they would have to pay a tax
that could go towards helping displaced workers or other social programs
such as education. The precise policy levers available to government are
discussed at length in Part III.C.267
2. Effectuating Redistribution
Some may be more moved by appeals to distributive justice than by
discussion of externalities.268 As discussed in Part I.C.4, the impact of
innovation on employment is highly uneven across society,
disproportionately harming some people and helping others.269 It is
perhaps not surprising, then, that several commentators, including
famous company executives, have suggested turning to “Keynesian
policies” of government spending supported by taxation in order to help
those whose jobs are displaced by automation.270 For instance, Tesla’s
CEO, Elon Musk, has stated his view that “[artificial intelligence] is the
biggest risk that we face as a civilization,” and speculated that
policymakers should try to slow down development and potentially even
give people a “universal basic income” (UBI) to help them get along
without paid work.271 The primary motivation behind these views is
266. Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 253; see also Ng, supra note 253 (“Some of these
negative externalities can be addressed through taxation and/or surcharges.”). Note that Acemoglu
and Restrepo do not specify whether the tax would be imposed on businesses that adopt robots or
the owners of the underlying intellectual property.
267. Another policy option would be to impose liability through the tort system. See Cooter
& Porat, supra note 250 (“When markets fail, liability law often improves the situation by making
injurers compensate victims.”).
268. See, e.g., Justin Hughes & Robert P. Merges, Copyright and Distributive Justice,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 518 (2016); see also MANKIW, supra note 249, at 13 (listing
alleviating inequality as a potential basis for government intervention in the free market).
269. BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 28, at 39 (“Even when technological progress
increases productivity and overall wealth, it can also affect the division of rewards, potentially
making some people worse off than they were before the innovation.”).
270. See, e.g., Jonathan Taplin, Can the Tech Giants Be Stopped?, WALL ST. J. (July 14,
2017, 2:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/can-the-tech-giants-be-stopped-1500057243
[https://perma.cc/P6ER-JLBB].
271. See, e.g., Catherine Clifford, Elon Musk: Robots Will Take Your Jobs, Government Will
Have to Pay Your Wage, CNBC (Nov. 4, 2016, 2:19 PM) https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/04/elon
-musk-robots-will-take-your-jobs-government-will-have-to-pay-your-wage.html [https://perma.cc/
87ZH-M6FK]; Tim Higgins, Elon Musk Lays out Worst-Case Scenario for AI Threat, WALL ST.
J. (July 15, 2017, 5:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musk-warns-nations-governorsof-looming-ai-threat-calls-for-regulations-1500154345 [https://perma.cc/Z7WW-W5E7].
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clearly a desire to correct the injustice of intense inequality—not a
concern about correcting inefficient market externalities.272
Of course, not everyone will agree that inequality alone is a solid basis
for adopting a policy that risks slowing down innovation and hindering
overall productivity. Anti-state libertarians, in particular, may chafe at
this idea.273 That said, Professor Miranda Fleischer and Professor Hemel
have argued that even libertarians might agree with some amount of
redistribution.274 One justification they give is that redistribution itself
may be akin to a “public good”—a non-rival, non-excludable resource
like a bridge or a road—that benefits many, yet is hard to exclude, and so
will not be generated without some government action.275 They observe
that, along with inequality, pervasive poverty and unemployment among
a large portion of the population can contribute to social ills, such as
increased crime.276 (Notably, utilizing automation in lieu of human
employees may exacerbate this connection between unemployment and
crime because fewer human employees typically means less security and
fewer “eyes on the street.”277) Therefore, when government adopts
policies to limit the number of people who are unemployed and who turn
to crime, this permits everyone to benefit from the luxury of being safe.
When viewed in this light, redistribution is not the end in itself, but
simply a means to achieving the end of a safer world for all.
In sum, whether it is conceptualized as a policy to alleviate inequality,
or as a policy to alleviate the societal ills that accompany unemployment,
272. Robert Reich, What if the Government Gave Everyone a Paycheck?, N.Y. TIMES: BOOK
REV. (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/books/review/annie-lowrey-givepeople-money-andrew-yang-war-on-normal-people.html [https://perma.cc/LU3V-WXGV]
(reviewing ANNIE LOWREY, GIVE PEOPLE MONEY (2018) and ANDREW YANG, THE WAR ON
NORMAL PEOPLE (2018)) (“A core challenge in the future will be how to redistribute money from
the ever richer owners of the robots and related technologies to the rest of us, who are otherwise
likely to become poorer and less secure.”).
273. Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 249, at 1193 (“[L]ibertarianism is—or at least is
generally thought to be—inhospitable to redistribution.”).
274. Id. at 1194–95.
275. Id. at 1227.
276. Id. at 1224–25. There are various mechanisms through which unemployment may
contribute to crime, though the precise relationship is a subject of debate. See Matthew D. Melick,
The Relationship Between Crime and Unemployment, 11 PARK PLACE ECONOMIST 30, 30–31
(2003) (identifying “two major schools of thought regarding the unemployment-crime
relationship,” one focusing on the “supply of offenders,” which may rise as employment
opportunities decrease, the other focusing on the “supply of victims,” which may actually fall
since people have less to steal).
277. See Shannon Pettypiece & David Voreacos, Walmart’s Out-of-Control Crime Problem
Is Driving Police Crazy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.bloomberg
.com/features/2016-walmart-crime/ [https://perma.cc/7365-HRBX] (discussing increased crime
around Walmart stores since the company began reducing the number of human employees).
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government intervention in the face of increasing automation can
theoretically be justified—despite the risk of a slight fall in productivity.
3. A Correction to State Intervention
A final justification for intervention is that intellectual property itself
can be seen as a form of prior government interference in the free
market—as simply another form of regulation.278 On this view,
intellectual property’s negative impacts on some forms of employment
are similar to other constraints imposed by the state that arguably lead
companies to shed jobs, such as minimum wage laws that make labor
more expensive for hiring firms or subsidies embedded into the tax code
that induce firms to invest in automation rather than labor.279
When government-created intellectual property rights are revealed as
a driver of technological un/employment, policies to alleviate negative
effects of the phenomenon on the workforce can be seen simply as
corrections to guide markets back to where they would be without the
incentive effects of intellectual property.280 For example, if government
creates intellectual property, and intellectual property is one reason that
millions of drivers lose their jobs upon adoption of self-driving cars, then
perhaps government is justified in taking action to help those drivers.
Crucially, as explored further below, any policies to alleviate social
ills produced by government action in creating intellectual property must
be moderated to avoid undermining the reason government creates
intellectual property in the first place.
C. Crafting a Policy to Address Technological Un/employment
If policymakers are swayed by one or more of these justifications, they
will need to carefully consider how best to regulate technological
un/employment. This Part identifies five threshold determinations that
must be considered in crafting a policy and assesses the various policy
278. See Mark Lemley, The Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 115
(2013) (suggesting that intellectual property law has come more and more to resemble
government-directed regulation); cf. Mossoff, supra note 165, at 1009 (“[N]atural rights
philosophy played an important role, albeit hardly single-handedly, in defining and protecting
patents as privileges in the early American republic.”).
279. Cf. Hemel & Fleischer, supra note 249, at 1213 (“Some individuals might be unable to
access the labor market due to constraints imposed by the state, such as the minimum wage or
licensing laws.” (emphasis added)). See also Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 22, at 150
(explaining various ways that the tax system “encourages automation by providing employers
with preferential tax treatment for robot workers. . . . Tax policies may thus result in automation
in some cases in which a firm would other- wise choose a human worker”).
280. But see Hemel & Fleischer, supra note 249, at 1213 (“[T]he fact that the state itself
stands in the way of full employment would likely not convince a minimal-state libertarian to
expand the state further by taxing for redistributive purposes.”).
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options. Ultimately, this Article favors more moderate policy measures
in lieu of blunt tools like bans.
1. Whether a Given Innovation Warrants Regulation
The threshold issue for regulators is how to identify an innovation that
warrants regulation. Part I.A defined labor-displacing innovations as a
subset of labor-saving innovations: innovations that eliminate or
significantly reduce the labor required to complete a task that would
otherwise be performed by paid human workers. Sometimes it is easy to
identify labor-displacing innovations because the inventors advertise
them that way. Oracle’s “Self-Driving” Database, for instance, can easily
be classified as a labor-displacing innovation, given that it is advertised
as being designed to eliminate human labor.281
But most innovations would presumably have less obvious impacts on
the workforce. Indeed, inventions can have a multitude of possible uses,
only some of which may have negative impacts on employment. For
example, Kraft Food’s patented method for making Swiss cheese (the
“Stine process”) had a long list of benefits, mostly related to the shape
and size of the cheese produced by the process.282 But it also happened to
fit more easily into “labor-saving trucks,” permitting a reduction in labor
costs.283 It would have been difficult to predict this impact ex ante.
Regulators, and courts in individual cases, may be able to make these
types of determinations, so long as they have sufficient data and a clear
legal standard. Intellectual property doctrine provides a framework for
classifying the impacts of “dual use” technologies. For example, the
Supreme Court has considered the impact, for purposes of copyright
infringement, of a video recording device that both permits unauthorized
copying of copyrighted content (a bad thing, because it depletes creators’
incentives to make content), and generates benefits like recording for
purposes of “time-shifting” (a good thing, because now people can record
content to view later). In these cases, the Supreme Court has directed
courts to consider whether the technology is “capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.”284
In this context, regulators can ask whether an innovation that has some
labor-displacing uses—such as an automated surgical tool with greater
281. See supra Part I.A.
282. Kraft Foods Co. v. Walther Dairy Prods., 118 F. Supp. 1, 20 (W.D. Wis. 1954), aff’d,
234 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1956).
283. Id. (noting that one benefit of the Stine process was that “[l]abor saving devices such as
lift trucks [could] be used for handling the cheese made by the Stine process, which are not
feasible with the large wheel Swiss”).
284. Dotan Oliar, The Copyright-Innovation Tradeoff: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Intentional Infliction of Harm, 64 STAN. L. REV. 951, 958 (2012) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

49

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [], Art. 2

352

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

precision than a human surgeon could ever achieve—is also “capable of
substantial non-labor-displacing uses” that outweigh adverse impacts on
some peoples’ jobs—such as saving lives that would otherwise be lost in
surgery. At the least, this type of legal standard could serve as a starting
point for making the difficult decision of whether to regulate.
2. Whether to Target the Point-of-Invention or the Point-of-Adoption
The second question to consider is when to regulate within the
innovation lifecycle. As described by Professor Brett Frischmann, there
are two temporal targets for innovation policy.285 A policy can target ex
ante investment decisions, which are made when inventors “decide how
to allocate resources among prospective inventive prospects,” or ex post
investment decisions, which are made after the results of the invention
have been developed.286 Intellectual property rights, research grants, and
R&D tax incentives, all target the ex ante decision point—whether and
what to invent.287 But many taxes and regulations target the ex post
decision—whether and how to adopt an invention once it has been
invented.288
In this context, government would have to decide whether to use
policy to affect inventors’ incentives or adopters’ incentives. In some
situations, this might mean regulating totally different entities. Inventors
of improvements in automation are likely to be research firms,
universities, or independent inventors, while adopters can be anything
from large financial firms to pharmacy chains to mom-and-pop
restaurants.289 In other cases, the decision-maker may be the same entity.
For instance, Uber is both an inventor of self-driving car improvements
and has plans to adopt it in the Uber ride-sharing business.
In some ways, the distinction is very important. Regulating at the
point of invention would presumably make it less likely that companies
would invent labor-displacing innovations in the first place. In contrast,
regulating at the point of adoption would permit invention, but it would
put strings on whether those inventions can be adopted in the
marketplace.
285. See Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S.
Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 356–57 (2000).
286. Id. at 356.
287. Id. at 356–57.
288. Id. at 356.
289. In these situations, adopters would have to purchase particular embodiments of labordisplacing technologies through distributors, or they be asked to obtain a license to the underlying
intellectual property. Either way, IP owners would be profiting due to possession of an exclusive
right. See Robert Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1477, 1500 (2005) (viewing a key function of patents as facilitating disclosure and transfer of
information related to innovations from creators to the most effective developers).
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However, the distinction may not make much difference. Most
regulations would presumably end up affecting both decisions to invent
and decisions to adopt. For example, banning drones that can deliver
packages would deter their adoption in the marketplace, but it would also
affect decisions to invent in this field.290 Likewise, taxing patents on
drones that can deliver packages would affect both the decision to invent
such technology, and the decision of whether to adopt it, since the tax
would likely be passed on to businesses to some degree. Because of the
feedback loop between decisions to invent and decisions to adopt,
whether government regulates at the point of invention or at the point of
adoption should not strictly matter when it comes to affecting incentives.
There is, however, a very practical reason why the distinction does
matter. As discussed above, deciding which innovations are “labordisplacing” is already a difficult task even with good information. The
earlier the government attempts to interfere in a technology’s lifecycle,
the more difficult this classification will become. When regulating at the
point-of-adoption rather than the point-of-invention, government should
have a better idea about whether a labor-displacing device will lead to
significant firing of workers. This weighs in favor of regulating after an
invention has been put into use.
3. Which Type of Regulatory Mechanism to Use
This Part addresses the question of precisely which mechanism to use.
There are a multitude of regulatory mechanisms available for alleviating
technological un/employment.291
a. Bans
The simplest option is to adopt a total ban on a certain labor-displacing
technologies.292 Some polities might try this option in the coming
290. The market for the technology would exert a “pull” on the direction of invention. Cf.
Peter Lee, Interface: The Push and Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2225, 2226 (2009).
291. In general, government can use a “stick”—a negative incentive to deter people from
acting in a certain way—or a “carrot”—a positive incentive to encourage people to act in a certain
way. This Article mainly discusses sticks. See Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks:
The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures to Innovate, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781, 1783 (2015).
292. A ban could be promulgated at the federal level by an agency within the Department of
Labor (DOL), U.S. DEP’T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov [https://perma.cc/7JJQ-EYNW], or an
agency within the Department of Transportation (DOT), such as the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA), which regulates vehicle design and manufacturing in order to
improve motor vehicle safety. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov
[https://perma.cc/NB76-7QP8]. But see Adkisson, supra note 220, at 12–18 (noting that under its
current statutory authority, NHTSA standards must, among other things, “meet the need for motor
vehicle safety” and not be technologically or economically unfeasible).
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years.293 The effect of a ban is what it sounds like: no more of the banned
technology within the jurisdiction. Advantages of a ban include that it is
comparatively easy to administer and, on the surface, cheap. Government
pays nothing directly, other than the cost of enforcement. Private actors
also pay nothing directly—though their bottom line may suffer.294
Bans are highly vulnerable to the Hayekian objection.295 With a
regulatory ban, the government’s lack of knowledge is front and center
because the government must know at the outset which particular
innovations to ban.296 Bans are also vulnerable to the “productivity is
everything” objection.297 Because a ban halts the prohibited technology
in its tracks, it is likely to negatively impact businesses’ productivity and
put the jurisdiction at an economic disadvantage.298 In other words, the
concerns highlighted in Part III.A are in full force. Bans are accordingly
unlikely to be a wise policy.
b. Intellectual Property Law
Intellectual property law itself provides another avenue for
effectuating some of the same goals as a ban. If intellectual property
increases incentives to generate and commercialize labor-displacing
innovations, then, by the same token, denying intellectual property for
labor-displacing innovations would reduce those incentives.
The most feasible way to institute this mechanism is through the
patent system, the only intellectual property regime in which prior
application is required to receive protection.299 Like Queen Elizabeth, the
government, through the USPTO, could begin to deny patents for
technologies that promise to eliminate significant numbers of jobs. For
example, if NCR Corp. applies for a patent for a laborsaving consolidated checkout system, whose express goal is to reduce
293. For example, India’s transportation minister, Nitin Gadkari, recently floated the idea of
banning driverless cars in the country, stating, “We will not allow driverless cars in India. We
don’t need it . . . . Each car gives a job to a driver. Driverless cars will take away those jobs . . . .”
See Rishi Iyengar, India’s Transport Chief: Driverless Cars Will Kill Transport Jobs, CNN (July
25, 2017, 11:47 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/25/technology/india-driverless-carsjobs/index.html [https://perma.cc/9QN6-H7KC].
294. See Ayres & Kapczynski, supra note 291, at 1786 (“[I]f a government has a choice
between a threat or a payment to induce innovation, ceteris paribus, the threat will be cheaper.”).
295. See supra Part III.A.2; see also, e.g., Cooter, supra note 239, at 378–79 (discussing
various types of “technology policy”).
296. See supra Part III.A.1.
297. See supra Part III.A.1.
298. See supra Part III.A.1; see also Hemel, supra note 237 (discussing the possibility of a
robot subsidy instead of a robot tax in order to avoid unemployment and economic inequality).
299. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (providing protection for
unregistered trademarks).
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labor costs associated with the retail grocery or supermarket industry,300
this would be denied.
While a “job saving patent bar”—barring patents for specific
inventions—could achieve the desired effect of dampening incentives to
generate labor-displacing inventions, the idea faces significant
challenges. The first problem is simply that the patent office lacks legal
authority to conduct these denials. The obvious legal means to
accomplish this type of subject matter bar would be the utility
requirement of Section 101 of the Patent Act.301 However, as presently
interpreted by the USPTO and the courts, the utility requirement does not
scrutinize the moral or economic implications of inventions.302 Thus, in
order to overcome long-accepted doctrine and case law from the Federal
Circuit,303 a statutory amendment from Congress would almost certainly
be required.
A more fundamental problem is the USPTO’s limited informational
capacity. Patent examiners would need to be able to accurately discern
which inventions will threaten the workforce in the future. But the patent
office has limited information about issues external to patent law.304 To
mitigate this problem, examiners might only be charged with flagging
potential labor-displacing inventions. They could then require patentees
themselves to submit an impact statement delineating how the invention
is likely to impact the labor market. This would at least permit examiners
to draw on private knowledge in making its decisions. Alternatively, the
examiner could put the patent prosecution on hold and forward the
application and impact statement to a separate agency within the
Department of Commerce, such as the Small Business Administration
(SBA). Either way, a subject matter bar would seem to require significant
information that government is unlikely to possess so early in an
invention’s lifecycle.305
A distinct objection is that an intellectual property subject matter bar
seems a highly roundabout way to affect incentives. As explained,
denying an intellectual property right does not deny the right to use the
technology. It just denies the exclusive right to do so. Government might
be better off just banning problem technologies outright. On the other
300. U.S. Patent No. 6,522,772 B1 col. 1 l. 14–23.
301. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
302. Seymore, supra note 176, at 1047–48.
303. Id. at 1059.
304. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and
Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1067–68 (1988) (noting that the patent system
is not seen as the proper governmental institution in which to make speculative judgments
regarding the “potential negative consequences” of new technology).
305. See supra Part III.C.3.
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hand, regulators might prefer the fact that a labor-displacing patent bar
would merely blunt incentives, not ban innovations outright. Denying
intellectual property rights could represent a compromise option in
comparison to a total ban. That said, if the government is trying to
dampen incentives to adopt labor-displacing innovations, it would
probably be better off using the tax system.306 This is especially true if
the government wishes to provide aide to displaced workers. Along with
the informational problem mentioned above, a major downside to the
intellectual property bar, as compared to a tax, is that it would not directly
provide aide for workers.307 Workers might be left with the worst of both
worlds: Subject-matter bars would not actually prevent companies from
automating, and they would not require any redistribution to workers.
In sum, even if patent bars are somewhat effectual in deterring
automation, they would probably be unworkable in practice and represent
only a partial solution for displaced workers.
c. Tax
Tax represents a natural alternative to the above options, and it is
likely to be the preferred mechanism of regulation, especially if the
primary goal is redistribution.308 The taxation mechanism would work as
follows: Government would impose a tax (a required payment of cash
into the public fisc) on companies that decide to invent or adopt
technologies that have an adverse impact on jobs. The tax could be
imposed on two discrete groups: businesses that adopt labor-displacing
innovations to automate work, or the owners of the underlying
intellectual property on labor-displacing innovations.
d. Taxing Businesses That Automate
The most often discussed tax proposal along these lines is the socalled “robot tax.”309 In an interview, Bill Gates discussed two versions
306. Cf. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 248, at 303 (noting that tax incentives have many of
the same advantages as intellectual property rights as innovation incentives).
307. A ban on IP for labor-displacing innovations might lower prices for downstream
consumers, who might also be workers. Id. at 371 (“[P]atent rights operate as shadow taxes that
enable patentees to charge prices above marginal cost.”).
308. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994) (“[R]edistribution
through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution through the income tax system and
typically is less efficient.”).
309. For critique of a robot tax from the “productivity is everything” perspective, see Hemel,
supra note 237 (“The concern that motivates most of these robot tax proposals . . . is that robots
will replace human labor as an input into the production process, leading to higher unemployment
and economic inequality.”).
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of this tax.310 The first version would tax business profits derived from
adopting robots, or other types of labor-displacing innovations, in lieu of
humans.311 The second version would tax the robots’ owners at the same
rate the robots would have been taxed if they were human workers.312
Gates explained this version of the robot tax idea as follows:
Right now, the human worker who does, say, $50,000 worth
of work in a factory, that income is taxed and [society] get[s]
income tax, social security tax, all those things. If a robot
comes in to do the same thing, you’d think that we’d tax the
robot at a similar level.313
Professors Ryan Abbott and Bret Bogenschneider explain how the
Gates robot tax might actually be effectuated within the current tax
system. For example, one seemingly simple option is to disallow
corporate income tax deductions for capital investments in things like
robots or automation software that give rise to the tax benefits achieved
by not having to pay human workers.314
A tax on businesses that adopt labor-displacing innovations has
several features that make it a potentially attractive solution. First, unlike
a ban, a tax does not stop companies from automating, but instead forces
companies to internalize the costs of doing so. While a tax would, to some
degree, discourage companies from replacing humans with technology, it
would not totally halt companies’ impulses to adopt productivityenhancing innovations or interfere with market forces.315 This helps
respond to both the Hayekian objection and the “productivity is
everything” objection, mentioned above.316 Second, because a tax is
imposed relatively late in a technology’s lifecycle—at the point-ofadoption rather than the point-of-invention—this alleviates the challenge
310. See Kevin J. Delaney, The Robot that Takes Your Job Should Pay Taxes, Says Bill
Gates, QUARTZ (Feb. 17, 2017), https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-the-robot-that-takes-your-jobshould-pay-taxes/ [https://perma.cc/AU3V-4SPN].
311. “Certainly there will be taxes that relate to automation,” Gates predicted. Id. “Some of
it can come on the profits that are generated by the labor-saving efficiency there.” Id.
312. See id.
313. Id.; see also Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 22, at 149.
314. Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 22, at 169; see also id. at 170–73 (discussing
several distinct options).
315. See Frischmann, supra note 285, at 382 (“[T]ax incentives have the potential to improve
market-based efficiency by providing indirect subsidies that align private firms’ incentives in a
socially desirable fashion.”); see also Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 248, at 328 (“[T]ax
incentives, like patents, rely on potential innovators—rather than government officials—to decide
(1) which inventions are worth pursuing and (2) which R&D projects are most likely to yield the
inventions in question. Like patents, tax incentives cause innovators to pursue inventions that will
succeed in the market . . . .”).
316. Cf. Hemel, supra note 237 (arguing for a robot subsidy, instead of a robot tax).
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of predicting a technology’s future impact on workers. Third, a tax would
permit government to collect tax revenues that can be redistributed via
the tax system to those who are harmed by labor-displacing innovation.
This is quite significant if a primary reason for regulating is concern over
unequal distribution of resources in the wake of technological innovation.
e. Taxing Intellectual Property Owners
One alternative is to tax the owners of intellectual property covering
labor-displacing innovations. For example, Professor Robert Reich
speculates a universal basic income (UBI) might be “financed out of the
profits going to . . . labor replacing innovations, or perhaps even a
revenue stream off of the underlying intellectual property.”317 One
version of this is a “job displacing intellectual property tax.” This would
be similar to the job-displacing patent bar described above, except the
penalty would be a tax on profits, not a denial of the patent. The amount
of the tax would be proportionate to the profits made from sales or
licenses of the underlying technology. For instance, if Google owned
intellectual property covering its computer chips used in artificial
intelligence systems (called TPU chips), and the government classified
these chips as labor-displacing innovations, then Google would have to
pay a small tax on those profits.318 The assumed effect would be a
marginal reduction in patenting of labor-displacing inventions, and a new
stream of revenues from companies that choose to patent labor-displacing
inventions anyway.319
The labor-displacing intellectual property tax has a few obvious
advantages over the labor-displacing patent bar. First, the labordisplacing intellectual property tax would be implemented at the point317. Robert Reich, Why We’ll Need a Universal Basic Income, ROBERT REICH (Sept. 29,
2016), http://robertreich.org/post/151111696805 [https://perma.cc/5NQK-KWYS]; see also
Reich, supra note 272 (discussing the concept of UBI); ROBERT MERGES, JUSTIFYING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 132–33 (2011) (discussing limited taxation of IP owners as a way to
force innovators who benefit from IP to give back to society).
318. See Cade Metz, Google Makes Its Special A.I. Chips Available to Others, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/technology/google-artificial-intelligencechips.html [https://perma.cc/6DGS-VNMM] (discussing Google’s plan to allow other companies
to buy access to its chips for use in A.I.); see also Reinhardt Krause, In AI Technology Race,
U.S. Chips May Be Ace-In-The-Hole Vs. China, INV. BUS. DAILY (Nov. 27, 2017),
https://www.investors.com/news/technology/ai -technology-u-s-chip-stocks-vs-china/
[https://perma.cc/8AEF-7TXZ] (“The race is on to build AI chips for data centers, self-driving
cars, robotics, smartphones, drones and other devices. . . . Google’s TensorFlow data-center
software runs on its own ‘TPU’ chips.”).
319. See supra Part II.C.1. One complication is that some inventors might choose secrecy,
rather than patenting, to avoid incurring the tax. A way to prevent this type of distortion would be
to tax income from licensing of intellectual property, including trade secrets, rather than patents
themselves.
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of-adoption rather than during the patent application stage. This would
allow time to see whether the invention is actually adopted in the
workforce and used to eliminate large numbers of workers, alleviating
the administrative difficulty in point-of-invention regulation. Second, the
main agency responsible would be the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
not the USPTO. This would assuage some of the concerns discussed
above about the USPTO’s limited capacity. Third, it would generate tax
revenues to go towards workers or towards social measures to curb
automation’s effects, such as education. Thus, even if the reader is not
convinced that automation generates negative externalities for
workers,320 she might see significant merit in the idea of a labordisplacing intellectual property tax from a fairness perspective.
The labor-displacing intellectual property tax also has some
advantages over a tax imposed on businesses that automate. First, this
option may resonate with policymakers interested in helping small
businesses.321 Businesses that adopt labor-displacing inventions include
farmers, restaurants, clothing makers, and mom-and-pop establishments
operating with small profit margins. In contrast, intellectual property
owners are likely to be larger firms like Uber, Alphabet, and Tesla.
Second, as discussed in Part I.B, from an economic standpoint, the
negative externality that gives rise to technological unemployment is
generated by the new ideas that permit reduction of labor. As explained,
the “pollution-spewing factory” in this scenario is not the farmer who
adopts the lettuce harvesting machine; it is the originator of the ideas that
goes on to experience increased profits due to an exclusive right. Thus,
even if the tax is ultimately passed on to businesses and consumers, it
makes greater economic sense to tax the externality at its point of
origin.322
4. What to Do with the Proceeds
Once the policymaker decides to pursue a tax and redistribution
strategy, a separate question is what to do with the proceeds. One
possibility is to institute a “universal basic income” (UBI). A UBI is a
guaranteed minimum income in the form of cash paid out to everyone on
a periodic basis, irrespective of whether they are employed or what their
income is.323 Several influential thinkers have spoken of a UBI as a
320. See supra Part III.B.1.
321. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 638 (2012).
322. Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 253 (“[T]he social planner will need to impose a tax
on automation . . . in order to combat the tendency of the decentralized equilibrium to automate
excessively.”); see supra Part III.B.1.
323. See Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 249, at 1196.
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potential panacea for a jobless future.324 The UBI has usually been
proposed as a traditional progressive tax, transferring wealth from rich to
poor.325 But a UBI could also be used in association with a tax on
innovators. For example, both the robot tax and the job-displacing patent
tax could be used to fund a UBI.326
Commentators have identified several problems with a UBI. Some
argue guaranteed subsistence payments may have perverse effects on
peoples’ incentives to work, and would exacerbate rather than help the
underemployment problem.327 Others see this as a positive. It could be
good, Professor Reich suggests, if people could have “more free time to
do what they want to do instead of what they have to do to earn a
living.”328
A solution built on guaranteed cash payments is attractive for various
reasons,329 but of course is not the only option. Another commonly
discussed option is to use tax proceeds for education and skills training
in order to help prepare workers to take on new jobs in the wake of rapid
technological shifts.330 Several commentators believe that improving the
education system is the key to helping people be able to participate in a
workforce dominated by computers and AI. 331 Education and targeted
324. Examples include Elon Musk and Robert Reich, discussed herein. See id. at 1199 n.32
(noting fears about automation are a reason for more attention to adopting a UBI).
325. As Professors Fleischer and Hemel explain, a UBI would presumably be drawn from
richer people, who would pay more in taxes, and then ‘redistributed’ to the less wealthy, who
would pay less in taxes but receive the same UBI. Id. at 1192 (“[The] UBI is, at its core, a program
of income redistribution.”).
326. See Reich, supra note 317 (discussing the possibility of a UBI).
327. Dan Nidess, Why a Universal Basic Income Would be a Calamity, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
10, 2017, 6:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-a-universal-basic-income-would-be-acalamity-1502403580 [https://perma.cc/9ACB-6PA2] (“[M]illions of Americans [would]
become dependent on the government and the taxpaying elite.”); see also Fleischer & Hemel,
supra note 249, at 1248 (“[An] objection to a UBI is that recipients will reduce work effort or
drop out of the labor force altogether.”).
328. Reich, supra note 317.
329. Some prefer the cash option as supporting both autonomy and efficiency: Recipients
can spend the cash in ways that work best for them, rather than having to rely on the allocation
decisions of others with less information. They could, for example, invest it in skills training if
they wish. See Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 249, at 1234.
330. See generally CITI GPS, supra note 58, at 115–24 (discussing how the education sector
can respond to the challenge of skills training).
331. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. AOUN, ROBOT-PROOF: HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE AGE OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 6–17 (2017) (arguing education needs to adapt to teach people to work
with AI); BESSEN, supra note 24, at 19–20 (arguing technology policy should include more focus
on skills training to help workers adapt to new technologies); see also Cade Metz, As China
Marches Forward on A.I., the White House is Silent., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/technology/china-trump-artificial-intelligence.html
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skills training would not ensure anyone who wants a job can get one. But
they would at least give people a better opportunity to work if they wish
to do so,332 and aid companies that are having trouble filling their current
needs for skilled talent.333
Yet of course there are several challenges here too—the most
significant being that education and skills training are not a solution to
unemployment caused by complete automation. If that occurs, society
may have no other option besides a UBI.
5. Which Level of Government Should be Responsible
A final issue to consider is the question of governmental allocation:
Which part of the United States government should be responsible for
crafting and administering a policy to address technological
un/employment? The author has previously argued that certain kinds of
innovation policy are better effectuated at the state and local level.334
Local governments may have superior incentives to act on behalf of
constituents, and superior information about local conditions, such as
availability and makeup of the workforce.335 Localizing regulation would
also permit tailoring of policies to different regions. For example, a state
robot tax could be instituted in Alabama, but not in California. Proceeds
could be used to train workers in the region.336
On the other hand, a better option might be to institute such taxes at
the federal level, because this would permit a geographic
redistribution.337 For example, under a job-displacing patent tax,
innovators in Silicon Valley, who own more patents than anywhere else
in the country, would pay taxes; the proceeds would be used to train
workers in other parts of the country, who are being displaced by those
[https://perma.cc/72JN-PKSC] (noting that the Obama administration saw educating students in
AI technologies as a key to improving the U.S.’s global competitiveness).
332. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller & Jess Bidgood, How to Prepare Preschoolers for an
Automated Economy, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/upshot/
how-to-prepare-preschoolers-for-an-automated-economy.html [https://perma.cc/G9JF-CTYR].
333. See supra Part I.C.5 (discussing skills gaps).
334. Hrdy, supra note 40, at 1334.
335. Id.
336. If states decide to tax intellectual property rights, there could be some interesting
preemption issues. For instance, if a state imposed an 80% tax on certain patents, this would likely
be preempted by the Intellectual Property Clause and the Patent Act. Camilla A. Hrdy, The
Reemergence of State Anti-Patent Law, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 133, 154–55 (2018); see also
MERGES, supra note 317, at 133 (“[A]t some point, tax rates climb so high that, in principle
anyway, the state may be seen to overstep the proper bounds of its authority.”).
337. See Camilla A. Hrdy, Cluster Competition, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 981, 989 (2016)
(arguing that the federal government can use federal funding for emerging innovation clusters to
“effectuate a geographic redistribution of resources from richer to poorer states”).
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inventions at higher rates. Even if the tax is instituted at the federal level,
administration of benefits programs should arguably be done at the local
level, especially if the proceeds are used for education and skills training.
Indeed, state and local governments already administer a wide range of
job creation programs, including skills training, many of them
specifically directed at developing a suitable workforce for companies in
the technology sector.338
CONCLUSION
The major focus of IP scholarship has been on whether intellectual
property promotes innovation.339 But this Article shows that if
intellectual property is successful in promoting innovation, then by
necessity intellectual property also facilitates and accelerates the pace of
technological un/employment: the simultaneous elimination and creation
of jobs brought about by technological change.
This Article generates two testable hypotheses regarding intellectual
property’s role. First, the Incentive Effect theorizes that intellectual
property protection magnifies incentives to generate labor-displacing
innovations, and thus marginally increases the size of the universe of
labor-displacing innovations in the economy, and the pace at which they
come into existence.340 Second, the Distribution Effect theorizes that
intellectual property, by design, increases returns for intellectual property
owners and, accordingly, increases demand and wages for those
employees whose skills are necessary to generate this intellectual
property; yet at the same time, intellectual property makes it marginally
more likely that other workers will be replaced by some of those same
innovations.341 The upshot is that intellectual property exacerbates the
unequal division of rewards between owners and generators of
intellectual property, and others whom those inventions replace. 342
To be clear, innovation is generally a very good thing, and has been
shown to be essential to the economic prosperity of nations.343 The entire
point of this Article’s use of the term “technological un/employment” is
that even labor-displacing innovation tends to create new jobs, sometimes
very good ones, just as it destroys or diminishes old ones.344 But many
commentators (including the author) are not certain innovation is on net
338. Hrdy, supra note 40, at 1362–74.
339. See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 317, at 1–11.
340. See supra Part II.C.1.
341. See supra Part II.C.3.
342. See supra Part II.C.3.
343. LERNER, supra note 234; see also Hemel, supra note 237 (“To make America
economically great again, we need a productivity boost.”).
344. See supra Part I.B.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol71/iss2/2

60

Hrdy: Intellectual Property and the End of Work

2019]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE END OF WORK

363

going to create more jobs than it displaces in the near future. Moreover,
commentators are disturbed by the declining quality and distribution of
available jobs, and the failure of education and skills training
opportunities to keep pace.345 Some form of policy may be necessary to
address this situation for purposes of distributive justice if not necessarily
efficiency.346
Intellectual property represents an underexplored avenue for such a
policy. As explained, this Article does not support denials of intellectual
property for labor-displacing inventions. While this strategy (might have)
made sense in Queen Elizabeth’s time, today’s government has far more
effective tools. This Article also opposes fully banning labor-displacing
inventions like autonomous vehicles because this risks unduly hindering
innovation and exceeds government’s predictive capacities. Instead, this
Article urges more moderate measures. For example, the government
might impose a small tax on profits from certain intellectual property
rights covering labor-displacing innovations.347 This tax should have a
twofold effect: to slow down the pace at which companies pursue labordisplacing solutions and to permit giving back to workers at least some
of what they lose through the tax system. The proceeds could be
distributed in the form of cash or in the form of social programs designed
to alleviate the negative impacts of job displacement. The government
cannot and should not stop the tide of market inclinations to innovate,
even when this leads to more automation of work. At most, the
government should try to marginally alter incentives and focus on
alleviating the negative impacts on some members of society in the here
and now. Indeed, slowing things down is arguably the government’s very
role in this type of circumstance.348
345. See supra Part I.C.
346. See supra Part III.B.
347. As discussed, there are several reasons to prefer a tax on intellectual property owners
rather than a tax on companies that choose to adopt labor-displacing innovations. See supra Part
III.C.3.c.
348. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS
OF OUR TIME 39 (2d ed. 2001) (“Why should the ultimate victory of a trend be taken as a proof of
the ineffectiveness of the [government’s] efforts to slow down its progress? And why should the
purpose of [government’s] measures not be seen precisely in that which they achieved, i.e., in the
slowing down of the rate of change?”).
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